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Across six experiments, I examined the role of metacognitive control in item-
method directed forgetting. In Experiment 1, participants studied loud and quiet items, 
which were subsequently cued as to-be-remembered (TBR) or to-be-forgotten (TBF). 
Typically, the volume of stimuli does not influence recall, although loud items are judged 
as more memorable than quiet items (Rhodes & Castel, 2009). In contrast, there was a 
unique recall advantage for loud TBR items when participants engaged in directed 
forgetting. Giving participants extra opportunities to engage rehearsal does not produce 
the selective advantage for loud items (Experiment 2), nor does emphasizing the 
importance of some items over others (Experiments 3 and 4). Experiment 5 manipulated 
the encoding fluency of the stimuli using a font type manipulation, which did not produce 
recall differences between the fluently and less fluently processed items despite the effect 
of font type on judgments of learning. Finally, Experiment 6 investigated participants’ 
beliefs about what helps them disengage from TBF items and what helps them retain 
TBR items. Specifically, after TBF or TBR items, participants were told to select earlier 
studied line drawings that varied both in perceptual size (small vs. large size image) and 
conceptual size (drawing of a small vs. large object in real life). I propose two 
mechanisms to explain the results. According to the rehearsal strategy mechanism, people 
use beliefs about item memorability to selectively rehearse certain items as a way to 
forget other items. According to the salience mechanism, people are drawn to 
perceptually salient stimuli when performing directed forgetting. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Performance in many memory experiments is governed by the goal of retaining 
information for a future memory test. The ability to determine how well one has learned 
something and to use that information to inform future study decisions is a crucial part of 
an adaptive memory system (e.g., Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; 
Nelson & Narens, 1990; Son & Metcalfe, 2000). A wealth of research on study time 
allocation examined how people regulate their remembering by analyzing either the 
length of time people spend studying items, or examining which items people chose to re-
study again in a second study session (see Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005; Son & Kornell, 
2008). Many theories explain how people regulate their remembering. The discrepancy 
reduction account proposes that, after studying a list of items, participants are more likely 
to want to restudy items that they think will be the most difficult to learn (Dunlosky & 
Hertzog, 1998; Dunlosky & Thiede, 2004; Mazzoni & Cornoldi, 1993; Thiede, 1999; 
Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999). The region of proximal learning model (Kornell & Metcalfe, 
2006; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005; Son & Metcalfe, 2000) states that difficult items are 
more likely to be restudied if they are in a list with other easy items because people think 
they do not need to spend time any more time studying the easy items. However, if the 
list is composed of moderately difficult to very difficult items, then according to the 
region of proximal learning account people will select to restudy the moderately difficult 
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items because they will perceive the very difficult items as impossible to learn. Finally, 
the agenda-based model of regulation proposes that whether participants select to restudy 
easy or difficult items may depend or constraints imposed by the task, like how valuable 
some items are compared to others (Ariel, Dunlosky, & Bailey, 2009).  
 Similar to research on regulation of learning, there has been a wealth of research 
examining how people exert control over forgetting. One such phenomenon that received 
extensive attention is directed forgetting, which typically shows that people can make 
themselves forget recently-learned information when instructed by an experimenter (e.g., 
Bjork, LeBerge, & Lagrand, 1968). Directed forgetting has been studied with a variety of 
stimuli, under many conditions of traditional memory paradigms of cognitive 
psychology, in different settings including clinical, social, and legal environments, both 
with humans and with animals (for an integrative review, see the edited volume by 
Golding and MacLeod, 1998). Despite nearly four decades of research on this topic, the 
examination of metacognitive factors in directed forgetting is in its infancy. Recently, 
Friedman and Castel (2011) examined the role of monitoring in directed forgetting, and 
showed that people estimate that they will be less likely to remember an item following 
an instruction to forget compared to an instruction to remember that item, suggesting that 
they are aware of the detrimental effect of a forget cue. I suspect that not only can people 
monitor the consequences of the forget cue, but that they also engage monitoring and 
control processes when they attempt the directed forgetting task, including determining 
whether or not to engage in directed forgetting in the first place. Forgetting deserves to be 
examined as a process separate from remembering (or failures of remembering) because 
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framing instructions in terms of forgetting influences the way people approach a 
metacognitive judgment task (Finn, 2008; Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, Bar, 2004). Thus, 
metacognition research may be overlooking important mechanisms if it focused strictly 
on remembering, or if it treated forgetting as the opposite of remembering. 
 Directed forgetting is one form of forgetting, but unlike unintentional forgetting 
that happens most of the time without much conscious control, directed forgetting 
requires the engagement of control mechanisms. In this paper, I approach the directed 
forgetting task from the metacognitive framework of monitoring and control (e.g., Koriat, 
2007; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994). I focus primarily on the 
item-method directed forgetting procedure, whereby participants are shown a series of 
items that are subsequently cued as to-be-remembered (TBR) or to-be-forgotten (TBF) on 
an item-by-item basis. This procedure produces a memory impairment of TBF items in 
recall and recognition tests, as well as implicit memory tests (for reviews, see E. L. Bjork, 
Bjork, & Anderson, 1998; Basden & Basden, 1998; MacLeod, 1998). It is generally 
agreed upon that directed forgetting in the item-method arises from processes operating 
during encoding (Basden, Basden, & Gargano, 1993; Bjork & Woodward, 1973; 
MacLeod, 1999; Taylor, 2005; Woodward & Bjork, 1971). When an item is presented, 
participants start to rehearse that item and they will continue to rehearse it if a TBR cue 
follows it, but they will stop rehearsing the item if a TBF cue follows it. Thus forgetting 
arises from terminating the rehearsal of TBF items. Some researchers have recently 
challenged this passive view of directed forgetting and have proposed that the actual 
process of stopping rehearsal of TBF items involves the recruitment of inhibitory 
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mechanisms (Fawcett & Taylor 2008; 2010; Hourihan & Taylor, 2006; Taylor, 2005; see 
also Zacks, Radvansky, & Hasher, 1996). For example, following the TBF cues, 
participants are slower to detect a secondary visual or auditory probe (e.g., Fawcett & 
Taylor 2008; 2010), and they show a larger inhibition of return after the TBF cues (e.g., 
Fawcett & Taylor, 2010; Taylor, 2005), suggesting that active attentional mechanisms are 
recruited in item-method directed forgetting. Consistent with this claim, neuroimaging 
work has shown that intentional forgetting relies on a distinct network of brain regions 
compared to the forgetting that occurs simply from a lack of remembering (Wylie, Fox, 
& Taylor, 2007; see also Ullsperger, Mecklinger, & Muller, 2000).  
 Regardless of the mechanism responsible for item-method directed forgetting, I 
approach this task by considering the importance of two different goals that it 
simultaneously invokes – remembering of TBR items and forgetting of TBF items. I 
suggest that how people accomplish those two goals likely involves metacognitive 
processes. To accomplish the goal of remembering TBR items, people may use the TBF 
trials as an opportunity to engage in further processing of TBR items, and they do so for 
the sake of enhancing their memory of TBR items later on during the test. Examining 
which items people select to rehearse during the TBF trials could be informative for 
understanding control processes aimed at remembering. For example, will people be 
more likely to rehearse the items they believe are less memorable and therefore require 
additional rehearsal, or will they be more likely to rehearse the items that they believe are 
more memorable because they think they will gain more by focusing their effort and 
energy on already memorable items? Thus, the process of deciding which TBR items to 
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rehearse during the TBF trials shares conceptual similarities with the study-time 
allocation decisions, and therefore the models of self-regulation of learning might explain 
how people allocate their rehearsal in order to accomplish the goal of remembering TBR 
items.  
 In contrast, to accomplish the goal of forgetting TBF items, people may engage in 
selective rehearsal of other items during the TBF trials out of a desire to distract 
themselves from the item they are trying to forget. In other words, they may be 
rehearsing earlier TBR items during the TBF trials for the sake of ensuring the forgetting 
of the items they are told to forget (rather than for the sake of remembering those TBR 
items). This would imply that people engage in controlled process aimed at forgetting, 
and the type of items they select to distract themselves during the TBF trials could be 
influenced by metacognitive beliefs regarding which items are better “blockers” of 
unwanted information.  
 Thus, the process of selective rehearsal invoked by the directed forgetting 
procedure can be serving two different goals, which may be influenced by different 
metacognitive biases and beliefs. Behaviorally, however, this may lead to a distinction 
without a difference because examining performance only in the directed forgetting 
group makes it difficult to disentangle the remembering component from the forgetting 
component, making it impossible to evaluate which goal was affected by metacognitive 
influences. Sahakyan and Foster (2009) recommended including a baseline group in the 
experiment, where all items are followed by TBR cues, and therefore performance in this 
condition could only be governed by the remembering goal. Comparing the directed 
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forgetting group and the baseline group would allow isolating the metacognitive 
influences on the forgetting goal separately from the remembering goal. 
 In addition to the control processes involved in directed forgetting task, how well 
people monitor the status of their memory during the experiment could in turn influence 
how they exert control in directed forgetting. There is recent evidence showing reduced 
judgments of the likelihood of later recall (i.e., judgments of learning or “JOLs”) 
following TBF trials compared to TBR trials, suggesting metacognitive sensitivity in the 
item method (Friedman & Castel, 2011). However, if participants feel that they have not 
learned an item they are told to forget, they may be less likely to engage in directed 
forgetting because they do not think they will remember it to begin with. Thus, the degree 
to which people’s monitoring captures how well they have mastered the information 
should have implications for directed forgetting performance.  
One approach to implicating the role of metacognitive factors in directed 
forgetting is to find manipulations that affect people’s beliefs about memory, without 
objectively influencing memory. If greater directed forgetting is obtained in some 
conditions than in others, it could be directly traced to metamemory rather than objective 
memory differences. Rhodes and Castel (2009) had participants study a mixed list of 
items presented in loud and quiet volumes. Although people rated loud items as more 
memorable than quiet items by assigning them higher JOLs, they recalled both types of 
items equally well. Importantly, the mechanisms driving this illusion were shown to have 
an effect on control processes by influencing participants’ future study decisions. When 
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asked to select which items participants wished they could re-study, they were more 
likely to select quiet items than loud items.  
Overview of the Current Experiments 
 This manuscript consists of two major sections. It reports six experiments, where 
the first four experiments establish that beliefs about item memorability influence how 
people perform an intentional forgetting task. The last two experiments, along with the 
interim analyses of the verbal reports and the output dynamics aim to test the theoretical 
mechanisms contributing to the effects observed in the previous experiments. More 
specifically, in Experiment 1, participants were exposed to a mixture of loud and quiet 
items, which were subsequently cued as TBR or TBF items. In the baseline group, all 
items received TBR cues. To preview the results, the directed forgetting group showed 
the same magnitude of impairment for both quiet and loud TBF items relative to the 
baseline group, indicating no difference in recall of loud and quiet TBF items. 
Importantly, the directed forgetting group remembered a greater proportion of loud and 
quiet TBR items compared to the baseline group, but the enhancement was larger for 
loud TBR items. This finding implies that directed forgetting group selectively rehearsed 
earlier presented loud TBR items to a greater extent than quiet TBR items. In Experiment 
2, I aimed to examine whether loud TBR items were rehearsed more because participants 
were using it as a strategy aimed at forgetting TBF items, or whether participants were 
simply rehearsing loud TBR items because they thought those items were more 
memorable and hence by focusing rehearsal on more memorable items they could 
enhance their overall recall performance later on. In Experiment 2, I eliminated all TBF 
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trials, and included additional trials during which participants could engage in extra 
rehearsal of earlier presented items. The results showed that when the forgetting trials 
were eliminated from the task, participants did not spontaneously rehearse loud items 
(unless specifically instructed to rehearse those items). Experiments 3 and 4 further 
established that the forgetting goal was critical for observing the loud item advantage. 
Specifically, loud and quiet items were assigned either graded positive values, or a 
combination of positive and negative values. The results of both experiments revealed 
that the loud item advantage emerged only in the context of forgetting – that is, when 
some items were assigned negative point values. Overall, the first four experiments 
established that when participants aim to intentionally forget some items, they tend to 
focus their rehearsal processes on those items that they think are more memorable (i.e., 
loud items). Thus, Experiments 1–4 provide the first empirical evidence that beliefs about 
item memorability influence how people attempt directed forgetting.  
Next, I present the analyses of the output dynamics along with analyses of verbal 
reports collected in Experiments 1–4. In Experiment 5, I tested the fluency hypothesis 
according to which a directed forgetting task may lead participants to focus their 
rehearsal on more fluently processed items. Participants performed directed forgetting on 
a list of easy-to-read (Arial font) items intermixed with difficult-to-read (Brush font) 
items. Finally, in Experiment 6, I tested the salience hypothesis according to which 
participants may select to distract themselves with more salient items in order to 
accomplish directed forgetting. Participants were shown a list of drawings that varied in 
perceptual size as well as in conceptual size, and were asked to provide JOLs for those 
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drawings. Later, they engaged in directed forgetting of unrelated words, and a subset of 
earlier drawings was presented either after TBR or TBF cues. Participants were told to 
select a drawing that they think will help them remember or forget the recently presented 
word. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 
 The purpose of Experiment 1 was to explore how a volume manipulation affects 
the directed forgetting task versus the remembering-only task. Although loud and quiet 
items should be remembered equally well when the instructions mainly emphasize 
remembering (e.g., Rhodes & Castel, 2009), instructions to forget may affect TBR and 
TBF items differently depending on the mechanism underlying item-method directed 
forgetting and how metacognition interacts with this mechanism. If forgetting arises from 
a passive process of stopping rehearsal, loud and quiet TBF items should suffer equally. 
At the same time, recall of loud and quiet TBR items should not be different because 
people should be rehearsing them equally, just like in a remembering-only task. If an 
active inhibitory mechanism targets individual items in directed forgetting, then loud 
TBF items might be forgotten more because they are perceived to be more memorable 
and thus might require more inhibitory efforts. In this case, recall of loud and quiet TBR 
items should be equal because the inhibitory mechanism will operate on loud TBF items 
only. Finally, a third possibility is that participants engage in an active forgetting process, 
but they do so by focusing rehearsal on the TBR items that they believe are more 
memorable as a strategy aimed at preventing encoding of TBF items. This should 
produce enhanced memory for loud TBR items compared to quiet TBR items because 
participants may select to devote their rehearsal to items they believe are more 
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memorable (i.e., loud TBR items) as a way of preventing encoding of TBF items. Recall 
of TBF items, however, should remain unaffected by volume because rehearsal will be 
focusing on loud TBR items only. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 96 UNCG undergraduates who participated for course credit. 
Materials and Design 
 The study list consisted of 32 medium frequency unrelated nouns (see Table 1). 
Each item was assigned equally often to the TBF and TBR cue. It was also presented 
equally often in a quiet volume and in a loud volume. During the presentation, items 
within each list were randomized with the constraint that no more than three cues of the 
same type and no more than three items of the same volume could follow in a row. 
 List items were recorded using Audacity (http://audacity.sourceforge.net/). Each 
item was recorded once and then two versions of each recording were created – a quiet 
version and a loud version. Each quiet item produced 50 dBs of sound (e.g., a word 
spoken across a room), whereas each loud version produced 55 dBs of sound (e.g., a 
word spoken in at point blank). The 5 dB increase is equivalent to an increase in the 
power ratio by a factor of 3.16, and it follows the 3-factor increase in volume reported by 
Rhodes and Castel (2009). 
 The design of the directed forgetting (DF) group involved a Volume (quiet vs. 
loud) by Cue (TBF vs. TBR) repeated-measures design. In addition to the DF group, I 
also included a baseline group in which all quiet and loud words were followed by TBR 
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cues (there were no TBF cues). The dependent measure of interest was the proportion of 
items correctly recalled, although I also collected and analyzed immediate JOLs. The 
primary reason for including the JOL stage was to ensure I replicate the findings of 
Rhodes and Castel (2009); however, the main goals concerned evaluating how the 
volume manipulation would influence recall.  
Procedure 
 Participants were told they would be presented with a list of words to study for a 
later memory test. Before the study session, however, they listened to a practice trial of a 
single nonword spoken at the quiet and loud volumes. The volume levels were preset and 
adjustments were made if a participant reported difficulty with hearing the quiet 
nonword. No participant reported difficulty hearing the quiet practice item. Participants 
then studied a list of 32 words presented over headphones at a rate of 5 s per word. A 
speaker icon appeared on the monitor for the entire 5 s to signify the study trial. 
Participants were then instructed to provide a JOL by indicating how likely they would be 
to recall that word later on, using a scale from 0 (not likely at all that I will remember the 
word) to 100 (very likely that I will remember the word). Participants were given 3 s to 
type each JOL into the computer and they were encouraged to use the entire range of the 
scale. The JOL entry appeared on the screen as it was entered and could be edited if a 
mistake was made. Next, a TBR or TBF cue appeared for 4 s. The TBR cues appeared in 
green-colored font and had two plus signs on either side of the word, whereas the TBF 
cues were in red-colored font and were flanked by two minus signs. Sixteen items were 
followed by TBR cues while the remaining sixteen were followed by TBF cues. 
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Participants were told from the outset of the experiment that their memory would be later 
tested only for TBR items, but that they would not be tested for TBF items and that they 
could forget those words. Each item-JOL-cue trial was separated by a 1 s inter-stimulus 
interval. 
 A baseline group was included that followed the exact same procedures as the DF 
group, except that they never received the TBF cues. Like the DF group, the baseline 
group was told upfront that each word would receive either a TBR or TBF cue. In reality, 
however, only TBR cues followed each item’s JOL trial. 
 After the study phase, participants engaged in a distractor task for 60 s, which 
involved writing down the names of as many United States that they could think of. 
Finally, a free recall test was administered in which participants were given 4 minutes to 
write down as many words from the list that they could remember. Participants were told 
to recall all studied words, including the ones they were told to forget. After recall, 
participants completed a brief post-experimental questionnaire designed to assess 
learning strategies, intentional forgetting strategies, and whether participants had a 
preference for rehearsing items of a certain volume. The two critical questions that I will 
analyze in this paper were the following: (1) “What did you do during the time the forget 
cue (the word “forget” with the minus signs) was on the screen?”  and (2) “Did you try to 
remember (a) loud words more than quiet words, (b) quiet more than loud, or (c) did you 
try to remember the loud and quiet words to about the same extent?”
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Results & Discussion 
 Recall. The proportion of words recalled for the baseline and DF groups across 
the volume and cue are displayed in Figure 1. Replicating Rhodes and Castel (2009), 
there was no difference in recall of loud and quiet items in the baseline group, t<1.  
 To completely evaluate directed forgetting in the item-method directed forgetting 
design, I assessed the degree to which the TBF items suffered and the TBR items 
benefitted compared to an all-remember baseline group (see also, Sahakyan & Foster, 
2009). I assessed these effects by comparing each item type in the DF group to the 
baseline group. 
A mixed ANOVA on TBR items, using Volume (quiet vs. loud) as the within-
subjects factor and Group (DF vs. baseline) as the between-subjects factor revealed that 
the DF group had greater recall (M=.47, SD=.15) than the baseline group (M=.32, 
SD=.15), F(1,94)=24.59, MSE=.045, p<.001. Additionally, there was a main effect of 
volume, (F(1,94)=10.06, MSE=.016, p<.01), with better recall of loud items (M=.42, 
SD=.10) than quiet items (M=.36, SD=.19). Interestingly, there was a significant 
interaction, F(1,94)=4.18, MSE=.016, p<.05. Loud TBR items were recalled significantly 
better than quiet TBR items in the DF group [(t(47)=3.29, p < .01], but there was no 
difference between the loud and quiet items in the baseline group, t<1. Therefore, 
compared to the baseline group, there was greater enhancement for loud TBR items 
(19%) than for quiet TBR items (11%) in the DF group.  
 I conducted similar analyses on TBF items to analyze the magnitude of directed 
forgetting impairment. The Volume (quiet vs. loud) x Group (DF vs. baseline) ANOVA 
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on TBF items revealed that the DF group showed impaired recall of TBF items (M=.19, 
SD=.10) compared to the baseline group (M=.32, SD=.15), F(1,94)=25.85, MSE=.031, 
p<.001, for the main effect of group. The main effect of volume was not significant, F<1, 
and neither was the volume by group interaction, F(1,94)=1.03, p=.31, suggesting that 
the magnitude of impairment was the same for the loud and quiet items. 
 JOLs. Table 2 shows the JOL values for quiet and loud items across DF and 
baseline conditions. Because TBR and TBF cues were presented after each JOL trial, 
they could not have influenced JOLs, and therefore I left the Cue factor out of the 
analysis. I included group as a factor in the analyses because the mere presence of the 
TBF and TBR cues may have changed the basis of JOLs and could have influenced the 
magnitude of the JOL effect compared to the baseline group. A Volume (quiet vs. loud) 
by Group (DF vs. baseline) mixed ANOVA on JOLs revealed only a significant effect of 
volume, F(1,94)=53.65, MSE=104.20, p<.001. Loud items received higher JOLs 
(M=63.02, SD=16.41) than quiet items (M=52.23, SD=18.35). The effect of Group was 
not significant, F(1,94)=2.63, p=.11, and neither was the interaction, F<1. Thus, loud 
items were judged as being more memorable than quiet items, replicating the findings of 
Rhodes and Castel (2009), and this finding was unaffected by whether participants 
received a mixture of TBR and TBF cues, or if they only received TBR cues.  
 Discussion. The baseline group remembered quiet and loud words equally well, 
replicating Rhodes and Castel (2009). In contrast, volume influenced recall in the DF 
group in unique ways. Although the recall of TBF items in the DF group suffered 
compared to the recall in the baseline group, quiet and loud items suffered to the same 
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extent from directed forgetting. In contrast, whereas the recall of TBR items in the DF 
group was enhanced compared to the baseline group, loud TBR items were remembered 
better than quiet TBR items. Equivalent impairment of quiet and loud TBF items seems 
to suggest that either forgetting was caused by simply ignoring all TBF items, or by 
engaging some active mechanism via rehearsing loud TBR items, which helped facilitate 
the forgetting of TBF items. I come back to the distinction between “ignoring to forget” 
and “actively rehearsing to forget” in Experiment 4. 
 The volume effect in TBR items in the DF group suggests two possibilities. 
Perhaps participants were using the TBF trials to selectively rehearse loud TBR items 
because they thought that loud items were easier to remember, and they therefore selected 
to devote their rehearsal to easy items (Dunlosky & Thiede, 2004; Nelson & Leonesio, 
1988; Son & Metcalfe, 2000). Thus the presence of TBF trials simply enabled them to 
engage in additional rehearsal. This implies that selective rehearsal of loud items was 
used as a strategy aimed at remembering as many TBR items as possible during the later 
test. Alternatively, participants in the DF group may have selected to rehearse loud items 
to a greater extent because they might have perceived loud items are better “blockers” of 
unwanted information. In other words, they engaged in selective rehearsal of loud items 
as a strategy aimed at forgetting TBF items. Experiment 2 was conducted to examine 
these hypotheses.
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CHAPTER III 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 
 If participants in the DF group engaged in selective rehearsal of loud items as a 
strategy aimed at remembering as many TBR items as possible, then why did I fail to 
observe a similar effect in the baseline group, which contained only TBR trials? The 
absence of this effect in the baseline group suggests that engaging in intentional 
forgetting is critical to producing a loud item advantage. However, the baseline group had 
twice as many items to keep in mind compared to the DF group, which could use the TBF 
trials as an opportunity to rehearse earlier TBR items. Thus, it is possible that the 
observed effects in the DF group may have had nothing to do with intentional forgetting 
per se and may have been driven by the goal to remember as many TBR items as possible 
(just like in the baseline group); however, conditions for additional rehearsal may have 
been more ripe in the DF group.  
If engaging in intentional forgetting is not critical in producing the loud item 
advantage, then I should observe a similar effect if I reduce the number of items 
participants had to remember for a later test, while also creating opportunities for 
additional rehearsal during study. Therefore, in Experiment 2, all TBF trials were 
replaced with an irrelevant task that did not involve memorizing. Participants were 
exposed to 16 TBR trials intermixed with 16 visual search trials (i.e., there was no 
directed forgetting manipulation in this experiment).  
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There were four groups, which differed with respect to the type of rehearsal 
instruction they received at the start of the experiment. The no-instruction group was not 
given any rehearsal instructions in order to evaluate if, in the absence of TBF trials, 
people would spontaneously choose to rehearse loud items provided they had 
opportunities to engage in additional rehearsal. Observing loud item advantage in the no-
instruction group would confirm that intentional forgetting is not critical in producing 
this effect.  
The second group was instructed to strategically rehearse those words that they 
think would improve their memory performance later (termed extra-rehearsal group). No 
mention was made regarding which type of items they should rehearse. The extra-
rehearsal group would provide even a stronger test of whether intentional forgetting is 
critical in producing loud item advantage. This group is meant to simulate the DF group 
because it is told to engage in rehearsal of earlier items without being told which items to 
rehearse; the main difference is that it has no TBF trials. If participants elect to rehearse 
loud items more, then I should see a loud item advantage in the extra-rehearsal group. 
Note that I might actually observe a quiet item advantage, implying that participants 
prefer to devote their rehearsal to more difficult items (e.g., quiet items). This prediction 
follows the results of Rhodes & Castel (2009) who found that participants indicated a 
preference to re-study quiet items more than loud items if given an opportunity to re-
study.  
The third group was told to rehearse the loud items during spare time in the 
experiment to see if people could actually distinguish between loud and quiet words 
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during rehearsal (termed rehearse-loud group). I expected to observe loud item advantage 
in this group, pending people could differentiate between the two types of items during 
rehearsal. Finally, the fourth group was told to rehearse quiet items during spare time in 
the experiment (termed rehearse-quiet group). If I observe a quiet item advantage in this 
group, it would imply that participants could have selectively rehearsed quiet items in the 
DF group of Experiment 1 if they wanted to. However, it is possible that even if 
participants are told to rehearse quiet items, they might not be able to rehearse them as 
effectively because during rehearsal, loud items might come to mind more fluently than 
quiet items, making it more difficult to rehearse the quiet items. Thus, the rehearse-quiet 
group might not show a quiet item advantage, and such findings would constrain the 
interpretations of directed forgetting effect obtained in Experiment 1.  
Method 
Participants 
 There were 128 UNCG undergraduates who participated for course credit. None 
of these participants had been in the previous studies.  
Materials  
 The materials were the same as in the prior experiments. The most important 
change involved replacing the TBF trials from the previous experiments with a visual 
search task that involved a conjunction search of colors and shapes. During the visual 
search trials, participants were shown a 6 x 6 matrix of 35 distractors and a single target 
item. The distractors consisted of a mixture of blue squares and red triangles, whereas the 
target was a red square. Participants were told to click on the red square as soon as they 
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located it amidst the distractors. The arrangement of distractors and the position of the 
target among the distractors were randomized for each participant.  
Procedure 
 Participants were told that they would hear words through their headphones and 
that they should attempt to remember them for a later memory test. Additionally, they 
were told that on some trials, they would not hear any words but would instead perform a 
visual search task. Two practice trials familiarized participants with the steps and 
procedures of the experiment.  
At the start of the experiment some participants were told that whenever they had 
spare time during the experiment, they should engage in one of the following activities. 
Participants in the extra-rehearsal condition were told to “strategically rehearse those 
specific words presented earlier that you think will increase the number of words you will 
remember during the test”. Participants in the rehearse-loud-items condition were told to 
“think back to the loud words that you heard from earlier and rehearse to yourself those 
loud items”. Participants in the rehearse-quiet-items condition were told the same thing 
except that any mention of loud items in the instruction was replaced with quiet items. 
Finally, the no-instruction condition was simply told that there may be spare time 
between the trials and that they should get ready for the next trial.  
 The presentation order of word trials and visual search trials was randomized with 
the constraint that no more than three presentations of each trial type (word vs. visual 
search), and no more than two presentations of each item type (loud vs. quiet) occurred in 
a row. During the word trials, a loud or a quiet word was presented via headphone at a 
21 
 
rate of 5 s following the procedures described in Experiment 1. Afterwards participants 
were given 3 s to type in their JOL response. A 4 s blank interval followed the JOL trials 
(in lieu of the TBR cue) to facilitate potential additional rehearsal. During the visual 
search trials, a matrix of shapes was presented for 5 s, and participants had to identify 
and click on the target. Following each visual search trial, just like in the word-trials, 
there was a 4 s blank interval to facilitate potential additional rehearsal. After all 32 trials, 
participants engaged in the same filler task and free recall tasks as those described in 
Experiment 1.  
 Finally, participants in the no-instruction group were asked:  (1) “After studying 
each word, you made a judgment about it and then there was a blank screen for about 4 
seconds. What did you do during the period when the screen was blank?” In addition, 
both the no-instruction group and the extra-rehearsal group was given the second 
question from the questionnaire (2) “Did you try to remember (a) loud words more than 
quiet words, (b) quiet more than loud, or (c) did you try to remember the loud and quiet 
words to about the same extent?” 
Design 
 The design involved a Volume (quiet vs. loud) by Instruction (rehearse-loud vs. 
rehearse-quiet vs. extra-rehearsal vs. no instruction) mixed factorial, where volume was 
varied within-subjects and instruction was varied between-subjects. 
Results & Discussion 
 Recall. A volume (quiet vs. loud) by instruction (no-instruction, extra-rehearsal, 
rehearse-loud, rehearse-quiet) mixed-factorial ANOVA was performed on recall. The 
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results are summarized in Figure 2. Neither the main effect of instruction (F(1,124)=1.17, 
MSE=.048, p=.33), nor the main effect of volume were significant, F(1,124)=2.46, 
MSE=.038, p=.12. However, there was a significant volume by instruction interaction, 
F(3,124)=13.05, MSE=.038, p<.001. Comparing the recall of loud and quiet items in each 
of the four conditions revealed that there was no difference in the no-instruction 
condition (t<1), indicating that although participants had opportunities to go back and 
rehearse earlier presented items, they did not show any preference for either type of item. 
The same pattern emerged also in the extra-rehearsal group, where the recall of loud and 
quiet items was equivalent, t<1. Although this group was instructed to rehearse earlier 
presented items during the spare time, it showed a 7% recall advantage compared to the 
no-instruction group (collapsed across volume), but the improvement was not statistically 
significant (p=.11). Because there was no significant difference in overall recall between 
the no-instruction group and the extra-rehearsal group, it suggests that the no-instruction 
group was most likely already rehearsing items during the spare time in the experiment 
even without being explicitly prompted to do so. Indeed, the verbal reports from the no-
instruction condition revealed that 66% of the participants indicated rehearsing earlier 
presented items during the blank periods of the experiment (in response to the first 
question of the post-experimental questionnaire). In response to the second question of 
the questionnaire, only 6% of participants in the extra-rehearsal group reported preferring 
to rehearse loud items, with 13% reporting preference for quiet items, and the majority of 
participants (81%) reporting having “no preference for any type of item”, X
2
(2, 
N=32)=33.25, p<.001. These findings are informative because they suggest that people 
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did not interpret the instruction to “rehearse the words that you think will help you 
remember the most” as an instruction recommending rehearsal of loud items. Because a 
large majority of people had no volume preference, it suggests that people do not choose 
to rehearse loud items as a way to help them remember the most. 
In contrast to the no-instruction group and the extra-rehearsal group, the 
remaining two groups showed advantage of those specific items that they were instructed 
to rehearse. Specifically, loud items were recalled better than quiet items in the rehearse-
loud condition, t(31)=5.25, p<.001, whereas quiet items were recalled better than loud 
items in the rehearse-quiet condition, t(31)=2.64, p<.05. Furthermore, in the rehearse-
loud condition, loud item recall was significantly enhanced compared to the no-
instruction group (t(62)=3.37, p<.01), whereas the recall of quiet items went down 
numerically compared to the no-instruction group, although this effect was not significant 
(t(62)=1.79, p<.08). Instructions to rehearse loud items may have led participants to 
somewhat neglect the quiet items during encoding, and there may have been a tendency 
to rehearse loud items at the expense of quiet items. However, caution is warranted with 
this conclusion because the decline in quiet item recall was not statistically significant. 
Finally, in the rehearse-quiet condition, quiet item recall was significantly enhanced 
compared to the no-instruction condition (t(32)=2.50, p<.05), whereas loud item recall 
did not suffer (t<1). This effect suggests that participants benefited from rehearsing quiet 
items, and that this did not come at the expense of loud items. 
 JOLs. A Volume by Instruction mixed-factorial ANOVA was conducted on 
JOLs. The results are shown in Table 2. There was a significant volume by instruction 
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interaction, F(3,124)=8.65, p<.001. Separate comparisons of quiet versus loud JOLs in 
each instruction group revealed that the extra-rehearsal group gave higher JOLs for loud 
items than quiet items (t(31)=3.60, p<.01), as did the rehearse-loud group (t(31)=5.36, 
p<.001), and the no-instruction group, t(31)=3.00, p<.01. The only group that did not 
show this effect was the rehearse-quiet group (t<1), which rated the loud and quiet items 
as equally memorable. The lack of the volume effect in the rehearse-quiet group is more 
meaningful in light of the magnitude of the same effect in the rehearse-loud group (20%), 
which was substantially larger than in the no-instruction group (6%) and the extra-
rehearsal group (8%). Thus, an instruction to rehearse loud items enhanced the volume 
effect, whereas instructions to rehearse quiet items eliminated this effect. 
 Discussion. Overall, the recall findings suggest that loud items have a recall 
advantage only when participants were explicitly told to rehearse the loud items. 
However, when left to their own devices, participants did not spontaneously engage in 
rehearsal of loud items. Furthermore, even when they were instructed to engage in extra 
rehearsal without specifying which type of items to rehearse, they still did not prefer to 
rehearse loud items. Interestingly, the rehearse-quiet group showed enhanced memory for 
quiet items suggesting that participants’ ability to rehearse quiet items was not thwarted 
by the fluency of loud items. Therefore, if participants wanted to rehearse quiet items 
during spare time, they could have done so in the remaining conditions. However, I never 
observed a quiet item advantage without specifically instructing participants to rehearse 
quiet items.  
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 The JOL findings, with an exception of the rehearse-quiet group, all showed that 
participants thought that loud items would be remembered better than quiet items, 
replicating Rhodes and Castel (2009). Upon closer inspection, the volume effect in the 
rehearse-loud condition was greater than in the other conditions suggesting that 
instructing participants to rehearse loud items had a reactive effect on their JOLs. Both 
loud and quiet items JOLs were affected by the rehearse-loud instruction, with loud items 
being judged as more memorable, while quiet items being judged as less memorable 
compared to the no-instruction condition. In contrast, the rehearse-quiet condition rated 
the two types of items as equally memorable, and this was driven by the decrease of loud 
item JOLs while quiet item JOLs were unaffected compared to the no-instruction group. 
This implies that the perception that loud items are more memorable is so robust that 
even the instruction to rehearse-quiet items cannot reverse this effect in favor of quiet 
items; it can at most eliminate it, but not reverse it. Although JOLs were not the primary 
focus of investigation, the finding that the volume effect can be influenced by 
experimental instructions is intriguing and deserves to be examined in future research.  
 Overall, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that providing participants with extra 
rehearsal opportunities is not sufficient to produce a memory advantage for any type of 
item without directly instructing participants to rehearse either loud items or quiet items. 
This implies that when participants only have the goal to remember items (without the 
competing forgetting goal), they do not spontaneously rehearse loud items to a greater 
extent than quiet items even when opportunities to engage in rehearsal are created 
throughout the experiment.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 
 
 The results of the experiments presented thus far suggest that the forgetting 
component is important for producing the loud item advantage (Experiment 1) aside from 
explicitly instructing participants to rehearse loud items (Experiment 2). In Experiment 3, 
I aimed to rule out an additional alternative interpretation of the data that does not require 
an intentional forgetting component. Specifically, directed forgetting cues may stress the 
importance of some items over others, with participants perceiving TBR items as more 
important than TBF items. If this is the case, then they may adopt a rehearsal strategy that 
capitalizes on metacognitive cues, like volume, in order to help them perform the task of 
remembering the more important items. That is, people might rehearse loud volume items 
not as a way to perform intentional forgetting per se, but as a way to help them focus on 
items that they believe to be more important, like TBR items. Therefore, I might observe 
a memory advantage for loud items even in a list where some items are deemed as more 
important than others without involving directed forgetting cues. 
 In Experiment 3, all TBR and TBF cues were replaced with point values, and 
participants were told that they would earn or lose points by remembering words. Half of 
the participants received only positive value points (+5 and +10), where +10 words 
signified the “more important” words and +5 words signified the “less important” words. 
This condition will be referred to as the prioritized remembering group because the goal 
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of this group is only to remember the words, but some words are more important than 
others because they are worth more points. The point value manipulation was crossed 
with the volume manipulation. If importance is the critical variable driving the loud item 
advantage, then +10 loud words should be better recalled than +10 quiet words in the 
prioritized remembering group. This is because +10 items are more important items than 
the +5 items, and participants may selectively rehearse the loud important words to a 
greater extent.  
The remaining half of the participants were assigned to the forgetting group, 
where they received a mixture of positive and negative value points (-5 and +10) crossed 
with volume manipulation. The +10 words in this condition signified the “more 
important” words, but -5 words were not merely “less important”, they were actually 
detrimental to performance. Thus, participants would be better off forgetting the -5 words 
and remembering only +10 words, even though they were never explicitly told to forget 
the -5 point words. Functionally, the forgetting group in the current experiment resembles 
the DF groups employed in Experiment 1, with -5 items being analogous to TBF items, 
and +10 items being analogous to TBR items. Therefore, I expected to obtain higher 
recall of +10 loud words over +10 quiet words in the forgetting group, similar to what I 
observed in Experiment 1. The critical predictions concern whether this effect should 
emerge only in the forgetting group, or whether it would emerge also in the prioritized 
remembering group. If importance is the critical variable driving this effect and 
intentional forgetting is irrelevant, then +10 loud words should be better recalled than 
+10 quiet words in both groups. In contrast, if having to engage in intentional forgetting 
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is critical, then +10 loud words should be better recalled than +10 quiet words only in the 
forgetting group, and there should be no such effect in the prioritized remembering 
group. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 64 UNCG undergraduates who participated for course credit. 
None of them had participated in previous experiments.  
Materials  
 The materials were the same as in the prior experiments. Items were rotated 
through the different volume and value conditions. Presentation order of items was 
randomized with the constraint that no more than three items of the same volume 
occurred in a row, and no more than three values of the same type appeared in a row. 
Procedure 
 The procedure was very similar to Experiment 1, except that instead of TBR/TBF 
cues, participants saw value points. They first studied items through headphones for 5 s 
and then performed a JOL for that word for 3 s. They were told that after making a JOL, 
a number would appear indicating how many points that word is worth if it is recalled 
during the test. Participants in the prioritized remembering group were told that, during 
study, words would receive point values of +5 and +10. Recalling a +5 word later on 
would add 5 points to their score, and recalling a +10 word would add 10 points to their 
score. Participants in the forgetting group were told the same thing about the +10 words. 
However, they were also told that some words would be followed by a -5 value cue and 
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that if these words were recalled later on, 5 points would be subtracted from their final 
score. None of the participants in the forgetting group were explicitly told to forget -5 
words. It was made clear to all participants that their goal was to earn as many points 
during the test as possible. Two practice trials familiarized participants with the steps and 
procedures of the experiment. 
 After studying the list, participants engaged in the same distractor and free recall 
tasks used in prior experiments. Importantly, before the test, the experimenter 
unexpectedly canceled the implications of point values (as is often done in directed 
forgetting procedure). All participants were told that every item would be worth +10 
points and that they should try and recall all items regardless of the original value 
assigned to that item.  
 Finally, the post-experimental questionnaire was administered. All participants 
were asked: (1) “What would you do when the +10 values would appear on the screen?”, 
(2) “What would you do when the -5 (or +5) values appeared on the screen?” and (3) 
“Did you try to remember (a) loud words more than quiet words, (b) quiet more than 
loud, or (c) did you try to remember the loud and quiet words to about the same extent?”. 
Results & Discussion 
 Recall.  The recall was analyzed following the same format as in Experiment 1. 
My critical predictions concerned the recall of +10 items (i.e., important items) across the 
forgetting group and prioritized remembering group, and therefore I focus my analyses 
on these items first. This analysis is functionally equivalent to the analyses on TBR items 
performed in Experiment 1. Critical for my hypothesis is whether I would obtain a recall 
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advantage for +10 loud words over +10 quiet words in the forgetting group only, or 
whether a similar effect would emerge also in the prioritized remembering group.  
 A mixed ANOVA on the recall of +10 items, using Volume (quiet vs. loud) and 
Group (forgetting vs. prioritized remembering) revealed a significant interaction, 
F(1,62)=5.10, MSE=.023, p<.05 (see Figure 3, right panel). The group effect was not 
significant, F(1,62)=2.37, p=.13, and neither was the volume effect, F(1,62)=1.20, p=.28. 
To follow up the interaction, I compared the recall of loud and quiet items in each group. 
There was a recall advantage for loud +10 items over quiet +10 items that emerged only 
in the forgetting group, t(31)=2.15, p<.05. There was no such difference in the prioritized 
remembering group, t<1. 
For completeness, I also analyzed the recall of +5/-5 items (i.e., less 
important/detrimental items) using mixed ANOVA, with Volume and Group as factors 
(see Figure 3, left panel). This analysis is functionally similar to the analyses on TBF 
items performed in Experiment 1. It allows evaluating the extent to which recall of 
detrimental words (i.e., -5) in the forgetting group suffered compared to less important 
words (i.e., +5) in the prioritized remembering group. A Volume (quiet vs. loud) by 
Group (forgetting vs. prioritized remembering) mixed ANOVA on recall of -5 / +5 items 
revealed neither a volume effect, nor an interaction effect (both Fs <1). The overall recall 
was lower in the forgetting group (M=.26, SD =.12) than in the prioritized remembering 
group (M=.32, SD=.14); however, the main effect of group did not reach conventional 
significance, F(1,62)=3.50,  p=.07.  
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JOLs.  Table 2 shows JOLs for each group across the point value and volume 
manipulation. A Volume by Group mixed ANOVA on JOLs showed only a significant 
main effect of volume, F(1,62)=65.82, MSE=83.26, p<.001. The group effect was not 
significant, F<1, and neither was the interaction, F(1,62)=2.18, p=.15. Overall, loud 
items were given higher JOLs (M=60.26, SD=16.71) than quiet items (M=47.17, 
SD=16.04), replicating previous research. 
 Discussion. To summarize, the critical finding of Experiment 3 was that the recall 
advantage for loud items emerged only for +10 items, and only in contexts where 
participants had to engage in intentional forgetting of half of the items. A loud item 
advantage was not observed in the prioritized remembering group where +10 items were 
intermixed with +5 items. Overall, the results in the forgetting group replicated previous 
findings of Experiment 1 in obtaining loud item memory advantage for important items. 
 The absence of this effect in the prioritized remembering group suggests that 
engaging in intentional forgetting is critical to producing a loud item recall advantage. 
However, a closer examination of recall in the prioritized remembering group suggests 
that participants may not have treated +10 words as more important than +5 words 
because they remembered +5 and +10 words equally well. If the prioritized remembering 
group is analyzed by itself using a repeated-measures ANOVA, it does not show a 
significant effect of value (all Fs<1). Thus, the manipulation of item importance in the 
prioritized remembering group was less successful than in the forgetting group, where 
+10 items were recalled better than -5 items. Equivalent recall of +10 and +5 items in the 
prioritized remembering group is interesting considering that in previous studies, 
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intermixing +5 and +10 values led to recall differences between the two types of items 
(e.g., Castel et al., 2002; Castel, Farb, & Craik, 2007; Friedman & Castel, 2011). One 
reason for the absence of the value effect in my experiment may have been due to 
crossing the positive value manipulation with the volume manipulation (in contrast to 
previous studies, where positive values were manipulated in isolation). The item’s 
volume feature could have offset the influence of the positive value manipulation (e.g., a 
loud item followed by +5 points may appear as important as a quiet item assigned +10 
points). Interestingly, research by Golding, Roper, and Hauselt (1996) found that people 
will often adopt a “betting” strategy when presented with an ambiguous cue. For 
example, when told that an item will have a 100% chance of being tested, participants 
will be more likely to devote additional processing efforts to that item. When an item has 
a 50% likelihood of being tested, participants do not devote half as much processing 
compared to a 100% item, but rather make a decision to process that item all the way, or 
not at all. It is possible, then, that participants in Experiment 3 tried to devote equal 
amounts of rehearsal efforts to +5 items as well as +10 items with the intention of 
maximizing the amount of points they could earn. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
EXPERIMENT 4 
 
 
 The goal of Experiment 4 was to use a wider range of value points to more 
successfully manipulate importance in the prioritized remembering group. The 
experiment was similar to Experiment 3, except that I introduced a new point value 
manipulation. Specifically, in the prioritized remembering group, items were followed 
either by +10 points or +0 points; in the forgetting group, I again used +10 and -5 points 
as before. The selected +10/+0 values not only employ a wider range, but they also create 
a situation where participants should neither forget the less important items (i.e., the +0 
items), nor should they try to remember +0 items to the same extent as +10 words. 
Participants should try to rehearse +10 items to a greater extent than +0 point items 
because they have no reason to do any further processing on the +0 items. Note that a +0 
cue is not the same as a forget cue because there is no penalty for remembering a +0 item. 
In contrast, the forgetting group should not only try to remember +10 items more than -5 
items, but they should also try to forget the -5 items.  
 The predictions regarding this experiment are similar to Experiment 3. In 
addition, I anticipated obtaining a value effect in the prioritized remembering group, 
which should make the interpretation of results in the forgetting group even stronger.
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Method 
Participants 
 Ninety-six participants participated for course credit. None of them had 
participated in previous experiments. 
Materials and Design 
 The materials, counterbalancing procedures, and the design were identical to 
Experiment 3.  
Procedure 
 The procedures followed Experiment 3, except that in the prioritized 
remembering group participants saw +0 value cues and +10 value cues. Finally, all 
participants completed the post-experimental questionnaire from Experiment 3, which 
was slightly adjusted to reflect the change in the point values used in Experiment 4. 
Results & Discussion 
 Recall.  I first analyzed the recall of +10 items (i.e., important items) using a 
Volume (quiet vs. loud) by Group (forgetting vs. prioritized remembering) mixed 
ANOVA because my critical predictions concerned the recall of +10 items. The results 
are summarized in Figure 4. There was no main effect of volume (F<1), but there was a 
significant main effect of group, F(1, 94)=5.24, MSE=.060, p<.05, and also a significant 
group by volume interaction, F(1,94)=4.72, MSE=.020, p<.05. The forgetting group 
remembered loud +10 items better than quiet +10 items (t(47)=2.05, p<.05), but this 
difference did not emerge in the prioritized remembering group (t<1). 
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 For completeness, I used the same ANOVA to analyze the recall of +0/-5 items 
(i.e., less important/detrimental items). The main effect of volume was not significant 
(F<1), and neither was the interaction effect, F<1. There was, however, a significant 
effect of group (F(1,94)=5.41, MSE=.030, p<.05), with the recall of the +0 items being 
greater in the prioritized remembering group (M=.25, SD=.14) than the recall of -5 items 
in the forgetting group (M=.19, SD=.11). In other words, the forgetting group attempted 
to forget the detrimental items (i.e., -5 items) compared to the prioritized remembering 
group, which had less important items (i.e., +0 items).  
 Unlike in the previous experiment, the value manipulation led to recall differences 
in the prioritized remembering group. A repeated-measures ANOVA in the prioritized 
remembering group, using Value and Volume as factors confirmed a significant effect of 
value, F(1, 47)=8.78, MSE =.043, p<.01 (Fs<1 for the remaining effects). This result 
shows that the prioritized remembering group differentiated between the +10 words and 
+0 words, implying a successful manipulation of item importance.  
 JOLs.  Table 2 shows the JOLs for Experiment 4. One participant’s JOL data was 
lost due to a computer error. A Group by Volume mixed ANOVA on JOLs showed only 
a significant effect of volume, F(1, 93)=70.15, MSE=147.18, p<.001. Neither the group 
effect, nor the interaction were significant, Fs<1. Overall, loud items received higher 
JOLs (M=61.80, SD=18.22) than quiet items (M=47.06, SD=17.60). 
 Discussion.  In the current experiment, I obtained recall differences between +0 
and +10 value items in the prioritized remembering group, suggesting that participants 
perceived +10 words as more important than +0 words, and rehearsed those to a greater 
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extent. In light of these findings, I again replicated the previous results in the forgetting 
group. Loud +10 recall was greater than quiet +10 recall in the forgetting group, 
suggesting that when participants have to forget some of the items (i.e., -5 items), they 
remembered loud +10 items over quiet +10 items. Consistent with the previous 
experiment, volume did not influence recall of “less important/detrimental” items – that 
is, loud and quiet items that received +0 or -5 point values were remembered the same. 
Finally, participants rated loud items as more memorable than quiet items in both groups.  
 Another important finding of Experiment 4 is that when people engaged in 
intentional forgetting of -5 items, recall for those items was impaired compared to recall 
of +0 items in the prioritized remembering group. This finding has theoretical 
implications for item-method directed forgetting. If people performed directed forgetting 
by simply ignoring TBF items, then I would expect recall for -5 items to be comparable 
to +0 items because people would ignore -5 items the same way they would ignore +0 
items. However, I obtained impaired recall for -5 items compared to 0 items. It could be 
that the forgetting group participants were more rigorous in monitoring the source of each 
item during encoding in order to exclude -5 items from the rehearsal set.  In contrast, 
participants in the prioritized remembering group may have accidentally rehearsed +0 
items because there was no cost to remembering these items. Thus, differences in the 
quality of monitoring across the two groups might account for impaired recall of 
“detrimental” items. It could also be that intentional forgetting recruits more active 
inhibitory processes that are different from passive ignoring of TBF items (e.g., Taylor, 
2005; Fawcett & Taylor, 2008).
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CHAPTER VI 
 
INVESTIGATING THE MECHANISMS PRODUCING THE LOUD ITEM 
ADVANTAGE 
 
 
Analyses of Output Dynamics 
 Thus far, I have interpreted the recall advantage of loud items over quiet items by 
evoking better encoding of loud items over quiet items in the intentional forgetting 
groups of Experiment 1, 3, and 4. However, it is possible that the disadvantage of quiet 
items reflects the influence of certain retrieval dynamics that favors loud items. For 
example, if loud items were processed more fluently in DF groups, then during free recall 
these items might be recalled first, causing output interference on the quiet items.  
 To test the output interference explanation, I evaluated whether the first recalled 
item was a loud item or a quiet item. A binomial test indicated that the proportion of 
participants in the DF groups (Experiments 1, 3, and 4) who output a loud item first was 
57% (p=.05), while the proportion of participants in the baseline groups who output a 
loud item first was 56% (p=.07). Overall, there was a tendency for participants to begin 
recall with a loud item, however the DF groups did not do this more than the baseline 
groups. The loud item recall advantage observed in the DF groups cannot be attributed to 
output interference because the degree to which loud items were output first was the same 
for both groups.
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Analysis of Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
 The intentional forgetting participants recalled more loud TBR items than quiet 
TBR items, suggesting that they rehearsed loud items to a greater extent than the baseline 
conditions. Participants in Experiments 1, 3, and 4 were asked “After studying each word, 
you made a judgment about it and then there was a blank screen for about 4 seconds. 
What did you do during the period when the screen was blank?”. If directed forgetting is 
achieved through a deliberate, strategic rehearsal process whereby participants rehearse 
previous TBR items that are believed to me more memorable (i.e., loud items) as a way 
to forget TBF items, I should expected to find a greater percentage of participants 
reporting rehearsal of earlier items in the DF groups than the remembering groups.   
All forgetting groups across Experiments 1, 3, and 4 were combined to form a 
global-DF group (N=128), and the prioritized remembering group from Experiment 3 
and Experiment 4 were combined to form a global baseline (BL) group (N=80). All of 
these participants had to indicate what they did during the time when the TBF cue (or -5 
cue) appeared on the screen. Participants that reported rehearsing previously studied TBR 
(or +10) items were coded as using a rehearsal strategy, whereas those that provided any 
other type of response were coded as using a non-rehearsal strategy. The coding of the 
responses into the two strategy groups was done by the experimenters and it was 
unambiguous (i.e., 100% agreement rate). The percentage of participants reporting a 
rehearsal strategy for Experiments 1, 3, and 4 is presented in Table 3. Below I report the 
combined analyses across these experiments. 
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Consistent with the predictions, a chi-square analysis revealed that more 
participants in the global-DF group (80%) reported rehearsing previous TBR items 
during TBF trials than did participants in the global-BL group (43%), Χ
2
(1, 
N=208)=31.57, p<.001. I also compared the global-DF group against the no-instruction 
group of Experiment 2. Because the no-instruction group had fewer items to keep in mind 
than the global BL groups, it had more conducive conditions for selective rehearsal. This 
group was asked to indicate what they did during the blank interval that was inserted after 
the JOL trial in lieu of the TBR cue. More participants in the global-DF reported 
rehearsing previous items compared to the no-instruction group (66%), Χ
2
(1, 
N=160)=3.24, p=.066. The results may have fell short of conventional significance 
because of the small size of the no-instruction group (N=32). Overall, these findings 
suggest that the intentional forgetting groups engaged in the selective rehearsal of earlier 
items to a greater extent than did the remembering groups.  
 In the next step, I examined which type of items participants reported rehearsing 
more during the experiment in response to the second question of the post-experimental 
questionnaire. This question asked “Did you try to remember (a) loud words more than 
quiet words, (b) quiet more than loud, or (c) did you try to remember the loud and quiet 
words to about the same extent?” I evaluated both the frequency of responses across the 
global-DF and global-BL groups, and also how those responses compared against the 
actual recall. The global-DF group consisted of the same participants as in the previous 
analyses, but the global-BL group included more participants, because with an exception 
of rehearse-quiet and rehearse-loud groups, all remaining participants were administered 
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a volume-preference question in their questionnaire. This analysis will allow me to 
measure the magnitude of the loud item recall advantage over quiet items among 
different groups of DF participants who indicated different types of rehearsal preferences 
during the experiment. 
 First, I calculated the difference between the recall of loud TBR/+10 items and the 
quiet TBR/+10 items because these items showed significant volume effect in my 
experiments. Then, I plotted the recall difference score by the type of reported volume 
preference (e.g., rehearsed loud items more, rehearsed quiet items more, or no 
preference) across the global-DF and global-BL conditions. Figure 5 summarizes the 
findings. Positive scores on the vertical axis indicate recall advantage for loud items, 
whereas a score of 0 indicates equivalent recall of loud and quiet items. I statistically 
evaluated all of the six conditions by comparing the recall difference score to 0 (to 
determine whether there was a significant loud item advantage), but I report only the 
significant findings in the text. 
  More participants in the global-DF group (28%) reported “rehearsing loud items 
more often” compared to the global-BL group (15%), Χ
2
(1, N=320)=8.81, p<.01. These 
reports were confirmed by the actual recall data, which showed that the global-DF 
participants had a significant recall advantage for loud items (t(35) = 5.42, p<.001). In 
addition, fewer participants in the global-DF group (59%) reported “no preference 
between loud and quiet items” compared to global-BL participants (72%), Χ
2
(1, 
N=320)=5.42, p<.05. Interestingly, despite indicating “no preference”, the global-DF 
participants nevertheless showed significant recall advantage for loud items (t(75) = 2.74, 
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p<.01), suggesting that they were not necessarily aware that they were rehearsing loud 
items to a greater extent. However, the recall advantage for loud items was much smaller 
among those indicating “no preference” compared to those reporting “preference for loud 
items”, t(110)=2.21, p<.05. Finally, there was no difference in the proportion of 
responses indicating “rehearsing quiet items more often” across the two global groups, 
Χ
2
<1 (13% in global-DF group and 14% in global-BL group). 
 The verbal reports analyses suggest that there may be two different mechanisms 
contributing to the loud item advantage in directed forgetting. The first mechanism is 
implicated by the group of DF participants reporting rehearsing loud items and, 
interestingly, these participants showed a robust loud item advantage. Thus, directed 
forgetting may in part be driven by a controlled strategy to rehearse more memorable 
items as a way to forget other items. A second group of participants reported having no 
volume preference but still showed a significant loud item recall advantage. This group 
may be operating under a different mechanism which produces a loud item recall 
advantage without conscious awareness. Note that the controlled mechanism produces a 
twice larger effect compared to the unconscious mechanism, which leads to a much 
smaller albeit reliable recall effect. Regarding the second mechanism, one possibility is 
that loud items were processed more fluently and participants may have had an 
unconscious preference to rehearse more fluently processed items during TBF trials. 
Another possibility is that loud items captured more attention during encoding because 
they were highly salient. Highly salient stimuli may provide a desirable context for 
intentional forgetting because people may associate loud, intense, or highly salient 
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information as good distractions from what they might currently be thinking about. These 
hypotheses are examined in the next two experiments. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
EXPERIMENT 5 
 
 
 Experiments 1 through 4 demonstrated a unique case of preferential remembering 
for loud items that occurred under conditions of intentional forgetting or when 
participants were given explicit instructions to rehearse loud items. In contrast, the 
standard remembering instructions did not produce recall differences across the volume 
manipulation, whereas JOLs consistently showed loud item advantage. It could be that 
loud items are processed more fluently than quiet items, and during encoding participants 
in a directed forgetting task prefer to rehearse fluent items more because ease of encoding 
is often associated with ease of retrieval (Benjamin & Bjork, 1996; Benjamin, Bjork, & 
Schwartz, 1998). If loud items have increased retrieval fluency, they might come to mind 
more easily during TBF trials and be rehearsed to prevent encoding of TBF items. I refer 
to this hypothesis as the fluency hypothesis. Because the ease with which information is 
encoded and retrieved is thought to be based on metacognitive processes that are 
mnemonic and nonanalytic (e.g., Koriat, 1997), it is possible that participants who rely on 
fluency to perform rehearsal in directed forgetting may not be able to report this behavior 
in a post-experimental questionnaire. In other words, the process may not be accessible to 
conscious awareness. 
 If fluency is one of the mechanisms driving the directed forgetting findings 
observed thus far, then other types of manipulations of fluency should also produce 
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similar effects. In Experiment 5, fluency is manipulated by altering the readability of 
some items on the list. Items are either presented in an easy-to-read font (i.e., “Arial”) or 
in a difficult-to-read font (i.e., “Brush”). If fluency is used as a heuristic to perform 
directed forgetting, I should observe a recall advantage for Arial TBR items compared to 
Brush TBR items. As before, this advantage should not emerge in an all-remember 
baseline condition. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 64 UNCG undergraduates who participated for course credit. 
None of them had participated in previous experiments.  
Materials and Design 
 The materials, counterbalancing procedures, and the design were identical to 
Experiment 1 with the exception that items were presented visually in either 32 pt. Arial 
font or 32 pt. Brush Script MT.   
Procedure 
 The procedures followed Experiment 1 with the exception that words were 
presented visually rather than auditorily (i.e., there is no volume manipulation in the 
current study), the JOL phase was 3 s, and the forget and remember cues were colored 
rectangles. The forget cue was a red-colored 4” x 2” rectangle centered in the middle of 
the screen. The remember cue was a green-colored rectangle of the same dimensions and 
located in the same position.
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Results & Discussion 
 Recall. Figure 6 displays recall proportions for the baseline and DF groups across 
the font type and cue. Consistent with previous experiments, there was no difference 
between recall of Arial and Brush items in the baseline group, t<1. 
 A mixed ANOVA on TBR items, using Font Type (Arial vs. Brush) as the within-
subjects factor and Group (DF vs. baseline) as the between-subjects factor revealed 
directed forgetting benefits. Overall, the DF group recalled a larger proportion of TBR 
items (M=.51, SD=.17) compared to the recall rate in the baseline group (M=.37, 
SD=.10), F(1,62)=14.48, MSE=.041, p<.001. The main effect of Font Type and the 
interaction however were not significant, Fs<1. To assess the costs of directed forgetting, 
I conducted a similar analysis on recall of TBF items. Replicating previous experiments, 
the DF group recalled a smaller proportion of TBF items (M=.24, SD=.13) compared to 
the baseline recall rate (M=.37, SD=.10), F(1,62)=21.68, MSE=.027, p<.001. The main 
effect of font type and the interaction were not significant, Fs<1. 
 JOLs. The JOLs are listed in Table 2. The JOL analysis revealed participants 
thought Arial items would be rememered better than Brush items, F(1,62)=14.41, 
MSE=31.89, p<.001. The effect of Group was not significant, F<1, and neither was the 
Font Type by Group interaction, F(1,62)=2.00, p=.16. 
 The baseline group showed equivalent recall for both Arial and Brush items 
despite greater JOLs for Arial items than for Brush items. In other words, although 
participants thought Arial items were more memorable, there was no difference in recall 
of the two font types in the baseline group. Similarly, the DF group showed no recall 
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differences between the two font types. This finding suggests that Arial items were 
processed more fluently than Brush items but participants did not disproportionately 
rehearse Arial items in conditions of directed forgetting.   
 It is possible that the reason I did not observe a recall advantage for Arial items 
over Brush items in the DF group is because the overall JOL effect in Experiment 5 was 
rather small. In contrast, in Experiments 1, 3, and 4, where there was a recall advantage 
for loud TBR items, the JOL effect favoring loud items was much larger. Thus, perhaps 
the fluency manipulation using the font type was not as strong as the volume 
manipulation. One way to address this concern is to look at individual differences in the 
size of the JOL effect and investigate if there is any recall advantage for Arial items 
among participants who show the largest JOL difference between the two font types. 
 The Relationship between the Size of the JOL effect and Recall. I calculated the 
difference between the average JOLs assigned to Arial items and to Brush items for each 
participant in Experiment 5, and used this JOL difference measure to divide DF-group 
participants into three terciles. Participants in the upper tercile showed a 9% JOL effect 
favoring Arial items, t(10)=5.95, p<.001; the middle tercile showed a small but 
significant 2.3% effect in favor of Arial items, t(10)=5.15, p<.001, and the lower tercile 
produced a 4.94% JOL effect in favor of Brush items (i.e., the reverse effect), t(9)=2.99, 
p<.05. Despite the pattern of JOLs across the three terciles, there was no recall advantage 
for Arial font items in any of the terciles (the recall results are shown in Table 4, top 
panel). 
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 In contrast, the same type of analyses performed by combining all of the DF 
participants from E1, E3, and E4 shows a very different pattern. Specifically, participants 
in the upper third showed 30% significant JOL advantage favoring loud items, 
t(42)=15.96, p<.001; the middle third showed only 9% significant JOL advantage 
favoring loud items, t(41)=23.08, p<.001; finally, the lower third showed no difference 
between JOLs for quiet and loud items, t<1. The recall findings favoring loud TBR items 
were parallel to those of the JOL effect (see Table 4, bottom panel). Namely, the recall 
advantage for loud TBR items over quiet TBR items was largest in the upper tercile. In 
the middle tercile, this effect was diminished, although it was still significant. In the 
lower tercile, there was no longer a significant recall advantage for loud TBR items. 
 To summarize, DF participants who rated loud items as more memorable than 
quiet items in Experiments 1, 3, and 4 showed the largest loud item recall advantage, 
whereas participants who did not rate loud items as more memorable than quiet items did 
not show this effect. These analyses suggest that the main finding in the DF group across 
Experiments 1, 3, and 4 (i.e., advantage for loud TBR over quiet TBR items) was greatest 
among people who held more extreme beliefs about item memorability. In contrast, in 
Experiment 5, regardless of the size of the beliefs about item memorability, I never 
observed a recall advantage for Arial font items. Together, these findings do not provide 
strong evidence that fluency is the mechanism mediating the recall effects in DF groups 
because it produced different effects in Experiment 5 and Experiments 1, 3, and 4. 
However, the findings do not provide strong evidence that a fluency mechanism is 
completely absent as a heuristic for rehearsal in directed forgetting. It is possible that the 
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font type manipulation was not a strong manipulation of fluency. Furthermore, perhaps 
there are various type of fluency. Changes in the fluency of processing auditory 
information, like volume, may invoke rehearsal processes in directed forgetting more 
easily than a visual fluency manipulation like font type. Further investigation is needed to 
test the fluency hypothesis.
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
EXPERIMENT 6 
 
 
 The Experiments 1, 3, and 4 demonstrate that directed forgetting participants have 
a preference to rehearse loud TBR items during the TBF trials, but they do not 
necessarily show preference to rehease fluently processed items in Experiment 5, at least 
when fluency is defined by changing the font type of the studied items. These findings 
suggest that the preference to rehearse certain types of items in response to directed 
forgetting is unlikely to be driven by a fluency mechanism. It could be that in response to 
directed forgetting, participants are simply primed to focus on more salient stimuli during 
the TBF trials as a way to prevent encoding of TBF items. I refer to this as the salience 
hypothesis of directed forgetting. Everyday observations suggest that when trying to 
intentionally forget an event like failing an exam or embarassing oneself at work, people 
tend to play loud music, watch a violent action movie, or go to a loud club or bar. In other 
words, intentional forgetting may prime the notion of focusing on increased salience as a 
strategy aimed at preventing reminding of unwanted information.  
 Stimulus salience has been shown to affect eye saccades and fixations according 
to top-down and bottom-up processes of visual attention (Fine & Minnery, 2009; 
Parkhurst, Law, & Niebur, 2002; Peter, Iyer, Itti, & Koch, 2005). Typically, salience is 
manipulated by varying the color, intensity, size, or orientation of an image presented in a 
participant’s visual field (e.g., Itti, Koch, & Niebur, 1998; Hodsoll, Humphreys, & 
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Braithwaite, 2006; Fine & Minnery, 2009; von Wartburg, Wurtz, Pflugshaupt, Nyffeler, 
Luthi, & Muri, 2007). When the size of an image was manipulated, for example, von 
Wartburg et al. (2009) found that saccade amplitudes increased as the size of the target 
stimulus increased. In other words, people are quicker to orient their gaze to larger 
images compared to smaller images. 
 To investigate the salience hypothesis, I presented participants line drawings of 
familiar objects. The salience of drawings was manipulated both by changing the size of 
the drawing itself (i.e., perceptual size manipulation), and by presenting the drawings that 
represent small or big objects in real world (i.e., conceptual size manipulation). 
Perceptually large drawings may have increased salience because they take up more 
space on the computer monitor and thus would be easier to notice. Conceptually large 
drawings may also have increased salience because they represent objects in the real 
world that are large in size. Thus if participants are told to imagine that object in their 
mind, the image would take up more space in the visual field. 
 In the first phase of the experiment, participants provided JOLs to line drawings 
that varied in perceptual size and conceptual size. In the second phase, they performed 
directed forgetting on words. Critically, for half of the participants, I presented a sample 
of four drawings from the first phase during the TBF trials and instructed participants to 
select the drawing that, when they looked at it or imaginesd it in their mind, did the best 
job of helping them forget the TBF item. The remaining participants selected drawings 
only during the TBR trials. If people intentionally forget or remember by focusing on 
conceptually or perceptually salient information, they should select conceptually large or 
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perceptually large drawings more often. However, if salience does not matter, then 
participants should be selecting the four types of drawings at random. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 64 UNCG undergraduates who participated for course credit. 
None of them had participated in previous experiments.  
Materials 
 Materials consisted of 32 words and 64 line drawings. The list of words used in 
earlier experiments was changed slightly for Experiment 6 in order to minimize the 
similarity between the words and the line drawings (see Table 1). The line drawings were 
taken from a database of 520 line drawings of common objects (Snodgrass & 
Vanderwart, 1980; Szekely et al., 2004) and are displayed in Table 5. Thirty-two of the 
drawings represented objects that were all smaller than a shoebox (e.g., tweezers, ring, 
camera), and these items were designated as conceptually small drawings. The remaining 
32 drawings were designated as conceptually large drawings because they represented 
objects larger than a car (e.g., mountain, house, elephant). A complete list of the items 
appears in the Appendix. Two versions of each drawing were created in order to 
manipulate perceptual size. Perceptually small items were .bmp image files with 
dimensions of 100 x 100 pixels (approximately 1.04” x 1.04” on a 96 DPI monitor) while 
perceptually large items were images of the same file type with dimension of 300 x 300 
pixels (approximately 3.125” x 3.125” on a 96 DPI monitor)
1
.  
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 The likelihood that a given drawing would appear perceptually large versus 
perceptually small was counterbalanced across participants. Furthermore, an attempt was 
made to equate the conceptually large drawings and conceptually small drawings on 
familiarity and complexity. A group of 40 participants rated all 64 drawings on how 
familiar the object represented by each picture was, and how complex each drawing was 
using a scale from 1 to 5, where higher numbers represent greater familiarity and 
complexity. While drawings did not differ on familiarity ratings (M=3.11, SD=.67 for 
conceptually small drawings, and M=2.93, SD=.87 for conceptually large drawings) 
(ts<1), conceptually large drawings received higher complexity ratings (M=3.46, SD=.71) 
compared to conceptually small drawings (M=3.01, SD=.58), t(31)=2.69, p<.05. Thus, 
whereas conceptually large and conceptually small drawings were considered to be 
equally familiar, the drawings of larger objects were rated as inherently more complex. I 
address this limitation in the General Discussion section.   
Procedure 
 There were two major phases in this experiment, consisting of (1) rating the 
drawings, and (2) completing the directed forgetting task involving words. Initially, 
participants were presented with line drawings for 5 s each and had 4 s to provide a JOL 
for that drawing using the same instructions as in the previous experiments. Presentation 
order of the drawing types was randomized with the constraint that no more than four size 
attributes of the same type were presented in a row. For example, no more than four 
perceptually large drawings, regardless of the conceptual size, were presented in a row. 
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 Following the ratings of drawings, participants completed an item-method 
directed forgetting phase on words combined with a picture selection task on a subset of 
trials. Participants studied 32 nouns for 3 s each. After each word was presented, a green 
or red rectangle appeared for 1 s serving as a TBR or TBF cue for that word respectively. 
The likelihood that a given word was followed by a TBR or TBF cue was 
counterbalanced across participants, and the presentation order of words was randomized 
with the constraint that no more than three TBR or three TBF items appeared in a row.  
 Following the presentation of the TBR or TBF cues, a sample of four drawings 
from the first phase of the experiment were presented in a two-by-two matrix. The four 
drawings represented one drawing from each of the four size categories (e.g., 
conceptually small / perceptually small, conceptually small / perceptually large, 
conceptually large / perceptually small, or conceptually large / perceptually large). For 
half of the participants, the four images were shown only after the TBF cues (select-to-
forget group), whereas for the remaining participants the images were shown only after 
the TBR cues (select-to-remember group). Participants in the select-to-forget group were 
told that after each TBF trial they would see a sample of four images from earlier and that 
they should select the drawing that, when they looked at it or imagined it in their mind, 
helped them forget the most recently presented word. Selection was made by a simple 
mouse click on the image. Participants in the select-to-remember group were instructed to 
select the drawing that when they looked at it or imagined it in their mind, helped them 
remember the most recently presented TBR item. The selection of the four images from 
the earlier phase was randomized without replacement, and the position that a given 
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image occupied on the screen within the array was randomized on each trial. After the 
encoding of the words and the picture selection procedure, participants completed the 
same distractor task as in the previous experiments for 1 min, and finally were told to 
recall all the words they had studied, including the TBF words. Four minutes were 
allocated for the recall task as in the previous experiments.  
Design 
  In the first phase, participants saw drawings that varied in perceptual size (small 
vs. large) and conceptual size (small vs. large), with both variables being manipulated 
within subjects. In the second phase, the design involved a group (select-to-forget vs. 
select-to-remember) by cue (TBF vs. TBR) mixed factorial, with group as the between-
subjects variable, and cue as the within-subjects variable. 
Results & Discussion 
 JOLs. First I present results of the analysis on JOL data collected during the first 
phase of the experiment (see Table 2). A Conceptual Size (small vs. large) by Perceptual 
Size (small vs. large) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on average JOLs. There 
was a significant effect of Perceptual Size, F(1,63)=81.42, MSE=152.53, p<.001, with 
perceptually large drawings receiving higher JOLs (M=58.61, SD=15.40) than small 
drawings (M=44.68, SD=15.61). Neither the effect of conceptual size nor the interaction 
were significant, Fs<1. Thus, participants did not rate images representing large objects 
in the real world as any more memorable than images representing smaller objects. 
However, they thought that images occupying larger space on the computer monitor were 
more memorable than images occupying smaller space on the monitor, regardless of the 
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size of the actual object represented by the image. The findings of perceptual size 
manipulation are reminiscent of prior research, which documents higher JOLs being 
given to words presented in large font than small font (Rhodes & Castel, 2008). The 
findings with drawings in the current experiment suggest that size manipulations in 
general may evoke beliefs of higher memorability regardless of the nature of stimuli. 
 Recall in the Directed Forgetting Task. The next set of analyses address recall 
performance in the second phase of the experiment. Specifically, I evaluate how recall of 
TBR and TBF words differed when people selected drawings as a way to remember or 
forget the word. Figure 7 shows the recall rates for both selection groups as a function of 
cue. A Group (select-to-forget vs. select-to-remember) by Cue (TBF vs. TBR) mixed 
ANOVA revealed a significant effect of Cue, F(1,62)=122.67, MSE=.019, p<.001, with 
better recall of TBR items (M=.41, SD=.18) compared to TBF items (M=.13, SD=.10), 
implicating a directed forgetting effect. The main effect of Group was not significant, 
F(1,62)=2.28, MSE=.020, p=.14. However, there was a significant interaction, 
F(1,62)=6.26, MSE=.019, p<.05. While recall of TBF items did not differ across the 
select-to-forget and select-to-remember groups (t<1), recall was higher for TBR items in 
the select-to-remember group than in the select-to-forget group, t(62)=2.34, p<.05. These 
findings mean that memory for TBR items improved when participants selected a 
drawing in order to remember TBR words compared to when they tried to remember the 
TBR words with no drawings (this is, because the select-to-forget group did not have 
drawings during the TBR trials). 
56 
 
 Selection of Drawing Types. The next set of analyses was conducted to see if 
participants had a systematic preference to select images of a certain size as a way to 
remember or forget words. For example, if people prefer perceptually salient stimuli 
when trying to forget information, participants should select perceptually large images in 
the select-to-forget group. On the other hand, in the select-to-remember group, 
participants may not be sensitive to either perceptual or conceptual salience because they 
will just try to relate the word to the object in the drawing regardless of its size. 
 Figure 8 shows the percentage of trials that each image type was selected in the 
two groups. For example, out of the 512 trials in the select-to-remember group (i.e., 16 
TBR trials for each of 32 participants) conceptually large/perceptually small images were 
chosen on 25% of the trials. I modeled the preferences (yes/no) for the four different 
types of drawings across trials using generalized estimation equations with a logit link. 
The predictors of the preferences were Group (select-to-forget group/select-to-
remember), Perceptual Size (large/small), and Conceptual Size (large/small), and the 
interactions between these variables. The Perceptual Size factor was significant, Wald 
X
2
(1, N=64)=11.00, p<.01, suggesting that participants from both groups preferred to 
select perceptually large drawings more than perceptually small drawings. The 
Conceptual Size factor was not significant, Wald X
2
 (1, N=64)=.47, p=.50, but there was 
a significant Group by Conceptual Size interaction, Wald X
2
 (1, N=64)=4.20, p<.05. The 
Group by Perceptual Size interaction was not significant, Wald X
2
 (1, N=64)=1.25, 
p=.26, and neither was the Perceptual Size by Conceptual Size interaction, Wald X
2
 (1, 
N=64)=.27, p=.60. 
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To follow up the Group by Conceptual Size interaction, I constructed an equation 
that tested the influence of Perceptual Size and Conceptual Size on the selection of 
drawings in the select-to-remember group only. The Conceptual Size factor was 
significant, Wald X
2
 (1, N=32)=11.58, p<.01, as was the Perceptual Size factor, Wald X
2
 
(1, N=32)=10.55, p<.01. The interaction, however, was not significant, Wald X
2
 (1, 
N=32)=.52, p=.47. The same analysis performed on the select-to-forget group revealed a 
significant effect of Perceptual Size, Wald X
2
 (1, N=32)=8.63, p<.01. The Conceptual 
Size was not significant, Wald X
2
 (1, N=32)=.09, p=.76, and neither was the interaction, 
Wald X
2
 (1, N=32)=.001, p=.98. 
 Overall, when selecting drawings to help with remembering TBR words, 
participants showed a preference for both conceptually large and perceptually large 
drawings. In contrast, when selecting drawings to help them forget TBF words, 
participants only preferred perceptually large drawings. 
 Does Selecting Certain Types of Drawings Affect Recall of Words? The results 
of the drawing selection analysis suggest that participants select different types of images 
when they are aiming to forget than when they are aiming to remember words. 
Furthermore, in the prior analyses of recall in the directed forgetting task, I have shown 
that memory for TBR items improved when participants selected a drawing in order to 
remember those words compared to when they tried to remember the TBR words with no 
drawings. Given that selection of drawings happened only during half of the trials of 
directed forgetting task (e.g., either on TBF trials or TBR trials), I analyzed the recall of 
individual items from the trials where the drawing selection task was performed. The goal 
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was to evaluate whether selecting certain types of drawings affected later recall of the 
word that was just studied, which would mean that certain drawing are more effective for 
forgetting or remembering. Perhaps conceptually larger drawings helped encode TBR 
items in the select-to-remember group because people were quicker to make associations 
between the TBR word and the large objects. Since conceptually large objects were given 
higher complexity ratings, it could be that they more easily lend themselves for creating 
spontaneous associations with the TBR words than if an object is rather simple. Likewise, 
in the select-to-forget group, selecting perceptually large / conceptually small drawings 
immediately following TBF cues may be more likely to prevent participants from 
encoding the TBF item because attention is more quickly averted to the perceptually 
large drawings and small conceptual size may help because small / simple objects may 
prevent the formation of spontaneous associations with the TBF word (unlike a 
conceptual large drawing that may lead to inadvertent associations with TBF word, 
preventing its forgetting). The quicker participants can focus their attention on something 
unrelated to the TBF item, the less likely they should be able to recall that TBF item later 
on. 
 To assess how selecting a given drawing type affected subsequent memory of 
individual words in the directed forgetting task, I modeled recall (0=not 
recalled/1=recalled) for the four different types of drawings across trials using 
generalized estimation equations with a logit link. The predictors of the preferences were 
Group (select-to-forget group/select-to-remember), Perceptual Size (large/small), and 
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Conceptual Size (large/small), and the interactions between these variables.  The model 
parameters are listed in Table 6. 
The group factor significantly predicted recall (implying a directed forgetting 
effect), but neither of the size factors nor the interaction terms significantly predicted 
recall. Therefore, selecting a specific type of drawing did not contribute to increased 
remembering of TBR items in the select-to-remember group, nor did it contribute to 
increased forgetting of TBF items in the select-to-forget group. 
These results suggest that the tendency to select certain types of drawings as a 
way to forget versus remember words did not actually affect recall for those words. 
Although the select-to-remember group preferred conceptually large and perceptually 
large drawings, selecting these drawings did not actually increase the likelihood that the 
preceding word would be better remembered. Similarly the select-to-forget participants 
had a tendency to select perceptually large drawings, suggesting that they thought these 
types of items would be more effective for forgetting. This was not the case, however, 
because the size of drawing selected had no influence on the likelihood that the preceding 
word would be forgotten. These results suggest that participants may have beliefs about 
which items help them remember or forget, but acting on those beliefs does not translate 
into recall differences.  
 Post-hoc Analyses of Semantic Content of Selected Drawings. Although the 
images in Experiment 6 varied in conceptual size (and perceptual size), they also varied 
in semantic content. Thus, it is possible that a preference for selecting conceptually large 
images in the select-to-remember group was driven by the content of those images. In a 
60 
 
post-hoc analyses, I was able to categorize the images into four semantic themes: 
Everyday Items (e.g., match, shoe, glasses), Locations (e.g., house, bridge, church), 
Living Things (e.g., grasshopper, elephant, dragon), and Vehicles (boat, tractor, rocket). 
If participants select drawings in order to evoke particular forms of semantic associations, 
they may select different themes to help them remember words compared to when they 
want to forget words. I calculated the percentage of times a given theme was selected in 
the select-to-remember and select-to-forget groups. The results are displayed in Table 7. 
The only significant difference across the two groups was for the Locations theme, with 
participants selecting location drawings more often as a way to remember words than 
when trying to forget words, t(62)=2.01, p<.05. Although there were numerical 
differences between selection groups for the remaining themes, the comparisons did not 
reach statistical significance, ps>.10. 
 Perhaps select-to-remember participants select conceptually large drawings 
because they are actually showing a preference for the drawings that are Locations. It 
could be that there is something special about Locations that helps with remembering 
TBR words. For example, it may be easier to create associations with the target word and 
a location (e.g., “object A is in location B”). If Locations are conceptually large 
drawings, this could explain the tendency to select conceptual large drawings. I 
calculated a Pearson’s r correlation coefficient between Conceptual Size and Locations, 
and indeed, there were positively correlated, r(62)=.55, p<.001. To test if participants 
selected drawings because of Conceptual Size or Location, I compared the proportion of 
drawings selected that were of locations versus non-locations only for the conceptually 
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large drawings. If the reason the select-to-remember group preferred conceptually large 
drawings is because these drawings were often of locations, and their decision was driven 
more by the semantic content of these location drawings, then I should expect a greater 
proportion of conceptually large location drawings to be selected compared to 
conceptually large non-locations. This was not the case, however. The average number of 
times a conceptually large location drawing was selected was the same (M=4.44, 
SD=1.81) as that of a conceptually large non-location (M=4.50, SD=2.05), Wald X
2
(1, 
N=32)=1.20, p=.27. These results indicate that the tendency for the select-to-remember 
group to select conceptually large drawings more often than conceptually small drawings 
was guided by conceptual size information rather than semantic information.   
 Discussion. When instructed to select drawings as a way to remember TBR 
words, participants showed a preference to select drawings that represented larger objects 
as well as drawings that were perceptually larger. In contrast, when participants were 
instructed to focus on images that helped them forget TBF words, they only selected 
perceptually large images. In other words, the preference for conceptually large images 
observed in the select-to-remember group disappeared when participants were instructed 
to select images that would help them forget words. 
 Perhaps when trying to forget, participants are drawn towards perceptually large 
drawings because these drawings are most effective in grabbing their attention and 
distracting them from the TBF word. Furthermore, these participants choose to ignore the 
conceptual features of the drawings because conceptually large drawings may 
spontaneously give rise to associations. In contrast, when trying to remember TBR 
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words, participants may be oriented towards perceptually large drawings but they also 
may focus on the conceptual features of the drawings because they think conceptually 
large drawings will be easier to associate with the TBR word. 
 The image selection results of Experiment 6 contrast with the recall results. 
Although directed forgetting was observed for both selection groups, the results of the 
logistic regression analysis suggest that the type of picture selected on a given trial had 
no influence on recall of the preceding word during the final test. In other words, the 
tendency for the select-to-forget group to select perceptual large images did not 
contribute to more forgetting of TBF items because recall for a word was not affected by 
the perceptual size of the selected drawing on that trial. Similarly, although the select-to-
remember group tended to show a preference for conceptual largeness and perceptual 
largeness, selecting these types of pictures did not actually contribute to increased recall 
of TBR items compared to trials in which conceptually small or perceptually small 
drawings were selected.  
 Finally, I evaluated whether the semantic content of the drawings was related to 
which drawings participants selected. There appeared to be a tendency to select drawings 
that were of locations in the select-to-remember group, but it was primarily driven by the 
conceptual size factor.
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CHAPTER IX 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
 Across the first four experiments I demonstrated a unique case of preferential 
remembering that occurred only under conditions of intentional forgetting or when 
participants were given explicit instructions to rehearse loud items. In Experiment 1, 
recall for loud and quiet items was the same under the standard remembering instructions 
(i.e., in the baseline group), but not in the DF group. When participants engaged in 
directed forgetting, the effect of volume on recall differed depending on whether the item 
was TBF or TBR. Although volume had no effect on TBF recall, loud TBR items were 
remembered better then quiet TBR items implicating that DF participants rehearsed loud 
items to a greater extent than quiet items. These findings suggest that there was an 
influence of metamemory on directed forgetting because rehearsal was dominated by the 
items that participants believed to be more memorable. Experiment 2 demonstrated that 
when opportunities were created for additional rehearsal by eliminating TBF trials and 
replacing them with an unrelated task, participants did not show a preference for 
rehearsing loud items, suggesting that having a goal to forget information is critical for 
observing a loud item recall advantage. 
 Experiments 3 and 4 provided additional evidence that engaging in intentional 
forgetting was necessary for obtaining a selective advantage of loud items. The loud item 
recall advantage was observed when positive value items were intermixed with negative 
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value items, but not when graded positive values were used. Specifically, loud +10 items 
were better recalled than quiet +10 items, but only when those +10 items were intermixed 
with -5 items in the list. I did not observe the same effect when +10 items were 
intermixed with +5 items (Experiment 3) or with +0 items (Experiment 4). These results 
suggest that experimental manipulations merely emphasizing some items over others in 
the context of remembering (without involving intentional forgetting) do not produce 
loud item advantage. Engaging in intentional forgetting of some items is critical for 
observing selective advantage  of loud items. The analyses of output dynamics in 
Experiments 1, 3, and 4 suggest that loud items were just as likely to be recalled early in 
the recall sequence as quiet items across both DF conditions and baseline conditions. 
Therefore, the quiet item disadvantage in directed forgetting groups cannot be a result of 
output interference. 
 The verbal reports analyses further confirmed that during the experiment, DF 
participants tended to rehearse previous TBR items more frequently than the BL 
participants. Importantly, more DF participants reported a preference for rehearsing loud 
items than BL participants, and it is the DF participants who actually showed a 
significant loud item advantage, whereas the BL participants did not. Finally, the 
majority of participants reported having no particular preference for either type of item 
during rehearsal, but the rates of such strategy were lower in the DF group than in the BL 
group. Interestingly, despite reporting no preference for either type of item, the DF 
participants nevertheless showed a significant loud item advantage whereas the BL 
participants did not.  
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 Overall, the results of these experiments along with the verbal reports analysis 
suggest that there may be two different mechanisms contributing the observed effects of 
volume on directed forgetting. The first mechanism indicates engagement of a controlled 
strategy aimed at forgetting. Many DF participants reported rehearsing loud items during 
the experiment, and they indeed showed the greatest loud item advantage. This implies 
that some participants were rehearsing the items they deemed as highly memorable in 
response to the forget cue out of desire to disengage from the current TBF item. The 
second mechanism underlying the loud item advantage in the DF group could involve 
some type of unconscious priming favoring loud items because 59% of the DF 
participants reported rehearsing both types of items equally well, yet the recall findings 
from those participants indicated that they remembered loud items better than quiet items. 
This suggests that some DF participants were not aware that they rehearsed loud items to 
a greater extent than quiet items, and the TBF cues may have unconsciously primed 
participants to prefer loud items. Although research has shown that people use encoding 
fluency as a mnemonic cue to make JOLs (Benjamin & Bjork, 1996; Benjamin, Bjork, & 
Schwartz, 1998; Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005), the results of Experiment 5 suggest that a 
fluency mechanism is not likely to be operating in directed forgetting. In other words, 
participants were not rehearsing fluent (i.e., Arial font) TBR items more than disfluent 
(i.e., Brush font) TBR items when trying to perform directed forgetting in Experiment 5 . 
 Further evidence against the fluency mechanism comes from the individual 
differences analyses, relating the size of the JOL effect for loud and quiet items to the 
recall of those items in directed forgetting. In Experiments 1, 3, and 4, the greater the 
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JOL difference between the loud and quiet items, the greater the likelihood that 
participants would recall more loud TBR items compared to quiet TBR items, implicating 
a link between metamemory and directed forgetting. In contrast, a similar relationship 
between the size of the JOL effect and recall was absent in Experiment 5. That is, people 
who thought Arial items were more memorable than Brush items did not remember more 
Arial TBR items when engaged in directed forgetting. 
 An alternative to the fluency hypothesis is the salience hypothesis. In Experiment 
6, I tested the idea that directed forgetting instructions prime people to prefer salient 
stimuli because they may associate highly salient stimuli with successful instances of 
intentional forgetting. For example, when people try to get something out of their mind, 
they may automatically seek environments full of intense energy, loud music, and bright 
lights because such a highly salient atmosphere allows for good distraction as it makes it 
hard to ruminate on the “problem” that one is trying to put out of mind. The results of 
Experiment 6 suggest that the types of stimuli people prefer to think about differ 
depending on whether people use the stimuli to help them remember or forget 
information. When selecting drawings to help forget words, people tended to focus on 
perceptual size information while ignoring conceptual size altogether. In contrast, when 
drawings were used to help remember words, people used perceptual size and conceptual 
size information to select a drawing. 
 I propose that when participants select drawings to help remember words, they 
evaluate the conceptual features of the drawings and tend to select drawings that are 
conceptually large. Conceptually large drawings are in general more complex and 
67 
 
participants may believe that complex drawings lend themselves to more elaborate 
associations to the TBR word. In contrast, when participants select drawings to help 
forget words they may ignore drawings’ conceptual features. These participants select 
both conceptually small and conceptually large drawings equally often. Although many 
of the conceptual large drawings were of specific locations, suggesting that people may 
have a preference for selecting location drawings when trying to remember words, there 
was no difference in the proportion of drawings selected that were of locations compared 
to non-locations among conceptually large drawings. Thus, the preference people had for 
conceptually large drawings was attributable to the drawings’ conceptual size, and was 
not driven by a specific preference for location drawings. Perceptually large drawings, on 
the other hand, may capture attention for all participants and this is why I observed a 
tendency for participants in both groups to select perceptually large drawings.    
 The tendency to select certain types of drawings did not influence recall. 
Specifically, selecting conceptually or perceptually large drawings did not improve recall 
of the preceding word, and selecting perceptually large drawings did not lead to increased 
forgetting of the preceding word. I interpret these results as an example of illusory beliefs 
similar to what was observed with the volume manipulation used in Experiments 1, 3, 
and 4. When participants studied loud and quiet items, they gave higher JOLs to loud 
items, yet recall in the standard baseline conditions showed no difference between the 
loud and quiet words, suggesting an illusory belief. In the DF conditions, however, this 
illusory belief was used to engage in selective rehearsal of the items people thought were 
more memorable (i.e., loud items). Interestingly, such strategy only led to an increased 
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recall of loud TBR items compared to quiet TBR items, but it did not lead to more 
effective forgetting of TBF items. In Experiment 6, I gave participants a choice of what 
to think about (i.e., the drawings) when attempting to remember or to forget words. The 
select-to-forget group preferred perceptually large drawings, although this selection had 
no effect on recall suggesting that selection preference was driven by an illusory belief. 
An influence of illusory belief emerges also in the select-to-remember group because 
they selected perceptually large and conceptually large drawings, but this selection 
behavior did not increase remembering. 
 An intriguing result from Experiment 6 is the finding that the overall recall of 
TBR items was greater in the select-to-remember group compared to recall of TBR items 
in the select-to-forget group. In other words, selecting some type of drawings after the 
TBR trials (as opposed to no drawings) helped with recall of TBR items later on. I 
interpret this finding in terms of more elaborative processing of TBR words presumably 
because participants were trying to associate them with the drawings (although the 
specific type of drawing apparently did not matter in enhancing recall). 
Rehearsal as an Active Mechanism in Directed Forgetting 
 Results of the current study have implications for theories of item-method 
directed forgetting. Prior research using the item method suggests that forgetting is 
guided by a rehearsal process where an item is first processed and rehearsed upon 
presentation. Rehearsal then continues for items that receive a TBR cue, but stops for 
items that receive a TBF cue. Intentional forgetting was mostly believed to arise from a 
passive process of not rehearsing TBF information (e.g., Bjork, 1972; MacLeod, 1999). 
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In contrast, Taylor (2005) and colleagues (Fawcett & Taylor 2008; 2010; Hourihan & 
Taylor, 2006) have argued that forgetting arises from an active process that operates by 
inhibiting rehearsal of the TBF item. Wylie, Fox, and Taylor (2007) have identified brain 
regions that are active during trials associated with successful intentional forgetting later 
on, and they have shown that these areas are distinct from the areas associated with 
accidental/unintentional forgetting. I agree with the notion that forgetting of TBF items 
requires an active process that is different from merely ignoring TBF items during 
encoding. As suggested earlier, results from the current set of experiments along with the 
verbal reports analysis indicate that participants rely on two distinct processes of 
intentional forgetting, a deliberate rehearsal strategy and a salience mechanism. Both 
processes are active in the sense that forgetting is achieved through engagement of 
rehearsal. The processes differ regarding whether or not the content of rehearsal is 
accessible to conscious awareness. However, both processes have metacognitive 
monitoring and control mechanisms that influence the nature of rehearsal. 
 When people use a conscious selective rehearsal processes to forget information 
in item-method directed forgetting, they rely on metacognitive beliefs about how 
memorable previously encountered information is in order to select which items to 
rehearse. The greater the perceived memorability of information, the greater the 
likelihood that the information will be rehearsed following a forget cue. Thus, I propose 
that, when engaged in item-method directed forgetting, participants select to rehearse 
items that they believe are memorable as a deliberate strategy to help them forgetting. 
Conceptually, this mechanism shares similarities with the mechanisms used to explain the 
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list method of directed forgetting (Sahakyan & Kelley, 2002). In list method studies, 
participants often retrieve extra-experimental distracting thoughts in response to the 
forget cue as a strategy to help them forget the unwanted items (Foster & Sahakyan, 
2011; Sahakyan & Kelley, 2002). The forget cue in the list method is presented only once 
after an entire list has been presented, and participants must forget all the items they have 
studied until that point. Thus, the list-method participants are more likely to retrieve 
other, unrelated thoughts from episodes prior to the experiment in order to forget 
unwanted items. In contrast, in the item-method studies, participants could retrieve the 
TBR items presented earlier as a way to prevent encoding of TBF items. In general, prior 
information can be strategically used to disengage from the TBF items in order to forget 
unwanted information. 
 When selective rehearsal is driven by a salience mechanism in order to engage in 
item-method directed forgetting, participants rehearse previous information that they 
believe is more memorable, but they do so in the absence of any explicit awareness or 
deliberate strategy. Instead, the rehearsal preference is guided by an implicit notion that 
bringing highly salient information to mind can disrupt encoding processes and increase 
the likelihood that recently learned information will be forgotten. This process may have 
been engaged by the participants in Experiments 1, 3, and 4 who did not report having 
rehearsal preference but still remembered more loud TBR items than quiet TBR items. 
Furthermore, the results of Experiment 6 suggest that perceptual salience is preferred and 
conceptual salience is ignored when the goal is to forget words. When the goal is to use 
drawings to help remember word, both perceptual and conceptual salience becomes 
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important. Thus, people carry an illusory belief that increased perceptual salience helps 
with intentional forgetting, and increased conceptual salience as well as perceptual 
salience helps with remembering. 
The Importance of Metacognitive Monitoring: Evidence from 
Judgments of Learning 
 The metacognitive framework proposed by Nelson and Narens (1990) indicates 
that information gathered by monitoring processes informs control processes and helps 
regulate learning. The same type of process may be operating in directed forgetting. Here, 
monitoring of the memorability of items during learning can be used to inform rehearsal 
processes when an instruction to forget is given. Thus, the role of metacognition in 
directed forgetting depends on participants thinking that some types of items are more 
memorable than others. 
 Judgments of Learning effects were observed across all six experiments. In 
particular, participants in Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 thought loud items would be more 
memorable than quiet items, except in the rehearse-quiet condition in Experiment 2, 
where JOLs for quiet and loud items were not different. In Experiment 5, Arial items 
were judged as more memorable than Brush items. Participants in Experiment 6 judged 
perceptually large drawings, regardless of conceptual size, as more memorable than 
perceptually small drawings. The results of the JOL analyses across the six experiments 
suggest that beliefs about the memorability of certain types of items over others could 
play a critical role in directed forgetting. Results of Experiment 5, however, indicate that 
thinking some types of items are more memorable than others is not sufficient to produce 
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the effect because DF participants did not selectively rehearse Arial TBR items as a way 
to forget TBF items. In addition to carrying beliefs about the memorability of items, the 
beliefs must be guided by perceptual salience, rather than encoding fluency, in order for 
people to engage in selective rehearsal of those types of items in response to the demands 
of intentional forgetting. 
Implications for Research on Metacognitive Control 
 The agenda-based model of metacognitive control has been invoked to explain 
self regulation of remembering. Results from the current experiments can be used to 
extend this model to help explain the self regulation for forgetting. The efficiency of goal 
attainment has been emphasized as an important component of the self regulation of 
learning (see Ariel, Dunlosky, & Bailey, 2009; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999), and it may 
also be an important component in processes of self-regulated forgetting. Overall, the role 
of an agenda in selective rehearsal could be to help determine what types of items should 
be rehearsed in order to meet the demands of the current task. When the goal is to 
remember, rehearsal may be allocated to items that participants think will help them 
remember the most number of items, and the types of items rehearsed is often dictated by 
current task demands (e.g., Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1998; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005). 
When a goal to forget is introduced, however, rehearsal efforts might shift to focus on 
items that are perceived to be more memorable or towards perceptually salient 
information. Overall, these studies provide the first evidence for the role of metacognitive 
control in directed forgetting.
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APPENDIX A 
 
TABLES 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Study Items from Experiments 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, (left) and 6 (right). 
 
 
air        ambassador 
ambassador       artist 
angle        barrel 
barrel        butter 
book        candle 
boss        chapter 
car        circle 
charter        competition 
claw        concert 
competition       cowboy 
convention       creature 
creature       engine 
devil        fabric 
fabric        gallery 
gallery        garage 
garments       girlfriend 
gift        hospital 
harness       jaguar 
hospital       leather 
intimate       library 
joke        metal 
lad        method 
lark        morning 
lawn        newspaper 
metal        orchid 
method       ornament 
newspaper       penguin 
odor        prisoner 
party        salad 
queen        seat 
salad        shadow 
unit        turnip 
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Table 2 
 
Mean Judgments of learning (JOL) by experiment, condition, and volume/font-type. 
Values in brackets represent ± SE of the mean. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                               
Experiment 1                                     DF group  Baseline group          
 
QUIET          55.35 (2.55)        49.10 (2.69)    
LOUD           65.10 (2.10)       60.93 (2.59)    
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Experiment 2  Extra-Rehearsal    Rehearse     Rehearse          No-Instruction 
                            Loud               Quiet        
  
QUIET    52.84 (3.32)       48.79 (3.26)        57.57 (3.73)   56.24 (3.28)      
LOUD     60.40 (3.47)       68.37 (2.81)        58.84 (3.78)   62.64 (3.27) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Experiment 3                 Forgetting group                    Prioritized Remembering  
                              
       -5 items        +10 items             +5 items           +10 items   
QUIET       47.10 (3.06)    47.48 (3.49)         47.08 (2.70)      47.03 (2.60)    
LOUD        64.22 (3.57)    61.26 (3.29)         56.10 (3.14)      59.43 (2.91) 
________________________________________________________________________
  
Experiment 4                 Forgetting group                Prioritized Remembering    
                   
         -5 items             +10 items             +0 items           +10 items 
QUIET              44.62 (2.76)       48.64 (2.67)         45.63 (2.47)        49.36 (2.83)    
LOUD               59.40 (2.82)       61.90 (2.76)         62.49 (2.67)        63.44 (2.70) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                                               
Experiment 5                                     DF group  Baseline group          
 
BRUSH          54.97 (3.24)        54.13 (3.25)    
ARIAL          57.35 (3.25)       59.33 (3.28)    
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Experiment 6 
 
Conceptual Size       small       large 
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________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Perceptual Size 
 small       44.52 (2.24)     44.83 (1.85) 
 large       58.18 (2.14)        59.03 (1.88)  
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3 
 
Percentage of Participants who Reported Rehearsing Previous TBR Items During TBF 
Trials (Experiment 1), or Rehearsing +10 Items During -5/+5 Trials (Experiment 3), or -
5/+0 Trials (Experiment 4). 
 
 
Condition 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 3 
 
Experiment 4 
 
 
Directed Forgetting Groups 
 
94% 
 
69% 
 
75% 
 
Prioritized Remembering Groups -- 22% 56% 
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Table 4 
 
Recall for Arial and Brush TBR items in Experiment 5 (top panel), and for Loud and 
Quiet TBR items collapsed across Experiments 1, 3, and 4  (bottom panel), as a function 
of JOL terciles. Values in brackets represent ± SE of the mean. 
 
 
JOL Tercile 
 
Brush TBR 
 
Arial TBR 
 
t 
 
df 
 
p-value 
 
 
lower 
 
.52 (.07) 
 
.45 (.07) 
 
1.07 
 
9 
 
.31 
 
middle .47 (.05) .50 (.07) .48 10 .64 
 
upper .52 (.05) .57 (.06) 1.10 10 .30 
 
 
 
 
 
JOL Tercile 
 
Quiet TBR 
 
Loud TBR 
 
t 
 
df 
 
p-value 
 
 
lower 
 
.47 (.03) 
 
 
.51 (.03) 
 
1.71 
 
42 
 
.25 
 
middle .38 (.03) 
 
.45 (.03) 2.64 41 .01 
upper .32 (.03) 
 
.45 (.03) 3.70 42 .001 
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Table 5 
Drawings used in Experiment 6. 
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Table 6 
 
The Effect of Group, Conceptual Size, and Perceptual Size on Recall in Experiment 6. 
 
  
Model Parameter Estimates 
 
 
Factors 
 
 
B 
 
 
S.E. 
 
Wald χ
2
 
 
df 
 
p-value 
 
 
 
Group 
 
 
 1.27 
 
.39 
 
10.60 
 
1 
 
<.01 
 
Conceptual size 
 
-.48 .39 1.48 1 .22  
Perceptual size 
 
 -.25 .38 .43 1 .51  
Group x Conceptual 
size 
 .81 .49 2.72 1 .10  
Group x Perceptual 
size 
.35 .46 .58 1 .45  
Perceptual size x 
Conceptual size 
.70 .58 1.43 1 .23  
3-Way Interaction term 
 
-1.05 .71 2.23 1 .14  
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Table 7 
Percentage of Drawing Selection by Theme and Group in Experiment 6. 
 
 
Drawing Themes 
 
Select-To-Remember 
 
Select-To-Forget 
 
t 
 
df 
 
p-value 
 
 
Everyday Items 
 
27.49% 
 
31.28% 
 
  .97 
 
62 
 
.34 
 
Locations 21.65% 17.00% 2.01 62   .049 
 
Living Things 28.22% 32.51% 1.02 62 .31 
 
Vehicles 22.63% 19.21% 1.21 62 .23 
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APPENDIX B 
 
FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1 
Mean proportion recalled as a function of group, cue, and volume in Experiment 1. The 
error bars represent ± SE of the mean. 
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Figure 2 
Mean proportion recalled as a function of group and volume in Experiment 2. The error 
bars represent ± SE of the mean. 
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Figure 3 
Mean proportion recalled as a function of group, item type, and volume in Experiment 3. 
The error bars represent ± SE of the mean. 
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Figure 4 
Mean proportion recalled as a function of group, item type, and volume in Experiment 4. 
The error bars represent ± SE of the mean. 
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Figure 5 
Recall difference between the loud and quiet TBR (or +10) words from Experiment 1, 3, 
and 4, plotted as a function of reported volume preference in post-experimental 
questionnaire in forgetting and remembering conditions 
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Figure 6 
Mean proportion recalled as a function of group, item type, and font type in 
Experiment 5. The error bars represent ± SE of the mean. 
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Figure 7 
Mean proportion recalled as a function of group and cue in Experiment 6. The error bars 
represent ± SE of the mean. 
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Figure 8 
Percentage of images selected as a function of group, perceptual size, and 
conceptual size. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
FOOTNOTES 
 
 
1 
Because 7 of the 64 drawings appeared somewhat small in the 300 x 300 pixel 
dimension, a larger pixel dimension of 400 x 400 (4.17” x 4.17”) was used to 
equate these items (i.e., blimp, boat, dinosaur, tank, teeth, tractor, and windmill) 
to that of the remaining 57 drawings. 
 
